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MADONNAS AND WHORES IN THE WORKPLACE 
Jessica Fink* 
ABSTRACT 
Much has been written about “lookism” – the preferential treatment given to those who 
conform to societal standards of beauty.  But in a recent case before the Iowa Supreme Court, a 
gender discrimination plaintiff alleged a sort of “reverse-lookism,” claiming that her male 
employer terminated her long-term employment because the employee was too physically 
attractive, thus tempting the employer to think about entering into an extramarital affair.  To the 
great surprise of many who followed this case, the Iowa Supreme Court sided with the employer, 
declining to find him liable for gender discrimination.  As one might expect, uproar ensued, with 
the media, the public, and the academic community eviscerating the court for its failure to 
recognize and rectify gender discrimination.  In story after story, reporters, academics and 
pundits framed this decision as one involving an “irresistible woman” and a man’s 
“uncontrollable lust.”  Yet while such characterizations made for catchy headlines, they were 
not quite true:  The court’s decision did not hinge upon outmoded stereotypes regarding gender 
roles, but rather contained a plausible factual and legal basis for denying the plaintiff’s claim.   
This article picks up where the Iowa Supreme Court left off, exploring the complicated 
reasons behind this employee’s failure to win her case, and suggesting alternate theories under 
which a similarly-situated employee successfully could challenge this type of termination.  The 
article also probes the reasons behind the vehement (and often misinformed) public reaction to 
this case.  It explores the ways in which the media systematically misrepresents women, 
particularly in the context of suits involving workplace gender discrimination, and examines the 
consequences of these errors, arguing that attempts to force women in the public eye into one of 
two molds – either pure and pristine with muted sexuality, or sexually promiscuous and vilified – 
has dramatic consequences for other employees in the workplace, for policymakers, and for the 
public at large. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Appearance matters.  In a variety of settings – social, professional, academic, and even 
familial – a person’s physical appearance impacts the treatment that he or she receives.  
Conventional wisdom dictates that “the beautiful people” come out on top in these interactions – 
that those who comport with accepted standards of physical attractiveness generally receive 
preferential treatment1.  Yet in a recent case before the Iowa Supreme Court, Nelson v. James H. 
Knight, DDS, P.C.,2 a plaintiff attempted to turn this conventional wisdom on its head, claiming 
that her married, male employer terminated her long-term employment because she was too 
physically attractive, thus tempting the employer to think about entering into an extramarital 
affair with her.3  To prove her case, the plaintiff not only cited her former employer’s admission 
that he fired Ms. Nelson because “their relationship had become a detriment to [his] family,”4 
but also provided evidence of numerous graphic and sexual comments that Dr. Knight had made 
toward her during her employment5 – comments that Dr. Knight did not deny.6  Despite this 
evidence, however, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, declining to find Dr. 
Knight liable for gender discrimination.7  According to the court, Ms. Nelson was not terminated 
due to her gender, but rather due to the consensual relationship between herself and Dr. Knight – 
a reason that was not deemed to be “because of a gender-specific characteristic.”8 
 
In the wake of this decision, observers from all facets of the legal and social landscape 
responded with ire: The media, the public, and the academic community all leveled harsh 
criticism at this (coincidentally, all-male) Iowa Supreme Court for its apparent failure to 
recognize and rectify gender discrimination.9  In story after story, reporters, academics and 
pundits framed this decision as one involving an “irresistible woman” and a man’s 
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2001; B.A., University of 
Michigan, 1997. I am grateful to my colleagues at California Western School of Law for their input regarding an 
earlier draft of this paper.  Many thanks also to Mallory Holt for her excellent and thorough research assistance. 
1 See infra notes 11-18 and associated text.  
2 Nelson v. Knight, 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013) (hereinafter, “Nelson”).  Notably, this was the second opinion that 
the Iowa Supreme Court issued in this case.  In December 2012, the Iowa Supreme Court first issued a decision 
affirming summary judgment to Dr. Knight.  See, Nelson v. Knight, No. 11-1857, 2012 WL 6652747, at *1 (Iowa 
2012) (hereinafter “Nelson withdrawn opinion”).  As discussed in greater detail below, the Iowa Supreme Court 
subsequently withdrew this initial decision and issued a second opinion in July 2013, in response to a petition for 
rehearing, but did so without any oral argument or rebriefing.  See Nelson, supra, at *65 n.1; see also The 
Irresistible Woman Meets The Incorrigible Court:  Iowa Supreme Court Issues New Opinion Upholding Firing in 
“Irresistible Attraction” Case, JonathanTurley.org (Blog), 2013 WL 17203377, July 15, 2013. 
3 See Nelson, supra note _ at 66. 
4 Id.  
5 See id. at 65-66.  
6 See id.  
7 See id. at 65. 
8 Id. 
9 See infra Section III.A.  For purposes of this paper, the terms “gender” and “sex” shall be used interchangeably.  
See, e.g., Francine Tilewick Bazluke & Jeffrey J. Nolan, “Because of Sex”:  The Evolving Legal Riddle of Sexual vs. 
Gender Identity, 32 J. OF COLLEGE AND UNIV. LAW 361, 365 (2006) (stating that “[b]ecause Congress intended that 
the term ‘sex’ in Title VII mean simply ‘man’ or ‘woman,’ there is no need to distinguish between the terms ‘sex’ 
and ‘gender’ in Title VII cases”) (quotations in original); but see id. (noting that “[s]ome academic writers… week 
to maintain or to heighten a distinction between the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender,’…”) (quotations in original) (citations 
omitted). 
“uncontrollable lust.”10  Yet while this ire created a convenient story for the press – a compelling 
way of framing this case – it ultimately was a misleading account of the Court’s decision.  The 
Iowa Supreme Court’s decision did not hinge upon outmoded stereotypes regarding gender roles, 
but rather contained a plausible factual and legal basis for denying the plaintiff’s claim.   
 
So why did everyone get this case so wrong?  How did so many “experts” in the field and 
so many members of the media either misunderstand (or perhaps willfully misrepresent) the 
nuanced reasons behind Ms. Nelson’s failure to win her case?  This article not only reexamines 
the facts at issue in Nelson and tries to frame the outcome of this case in a more logical and 
defensible light, but also endeavors to understand the reasons for the often-flawed coverage of 
this lawsuit.  Part I of this article will provide a more thorough description of the Nelson case, 
explaining the Court’s opinion not in the simplistic and divisive terms adopted by the media and 
others in the wake of this decision, but rather by citing the legal precedent and factual basis for 
this result.  Part I also will place this case in a context with other examples of women who have 
claimed that they were penalized for being “too attractive” for their workplaces.  Part II builds 
upon this broader context by examining how plaintiffs like Nelson, who believe that they have 
been terminated due to their (attractive) appearance, might prevail in bringing gender 
discrimination claims, by providing several theories under which such plaintiffs might succeed.  
Part III examines the media’s role in this case, looking at the reasons behind the vehement – and 
often misinformed – public reaction that this lawsuit generated.  This Part explores the ways in 
which the media systematically misrepresents women, particularly in the context of suits 
involving workplace gender discrimination.  It argues that women in the public eye ultimately 
are forced into one of two molds – either pure and pristine with muted sexuality, or sexually 
promiscuous and vilified.  This article argues that creating and perpetuating this false dichotomy 
has dramatic negative consequences not only for women in the workplace, but also for other 
employees, for policymakers, and for the public at large. 
 
I. “Too Hot for the Workplace”:  Nelson and Her Counterparts 
 
 Most individuals do not complain about suffering harm due to being “too attractive.”  
Indeed, quite the opposite typically is true:  Study after study has revealed the advantages – both 
in and out of work – for individuals who meet society’s definition of beauty.11  For example, 
studies show that we ascribe a host of positive traits to physically attractive individuals, 
assuming that such individuals “[are] happier, possess more socially desirable personalities, 
practice more prestigious occupations, and exhibit higher marital competence.”12  We view 
10 See infra Section III.A. 
11 See generally William R. Corbett, Hotness Discrimination:  Appearance Discrimination as a Mirror for 
Reflecting on the Body of Employment Discrimination Law, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 615 (2011); Enbar Toledano, The 
Looking-Glass Ceiling:  Appearance-Based Discrimination in the Workplace, 19 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 683 
(2013); see also Michael Kimmel, Fired for Being Beautiful, NEW YORK TIMES, July 16, 2013; cf.  Ashley Robin 
Brown, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who are You to Say Who is Fairest of Them All?, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 
54 (2013) (examining the weaknesses in the argument that more attractive individuals enjoy greater advantages). 
12 See Toledano, supra note 11, at 692; see also id. at 683 (noting that “we not only value beauty in the abstract, but 
we also generally believe that beautiful people are, in fact, better people”); Corbett, supra note11, at 625 (citation 
omitted) (noting that “[r]ecent research indicates that there is a high correlation between beauty and happiness, with 
a significant part of the happiness attributable  to the beautiful person’s higher earnings, and the higher earnings of 
the beautiful person’s beautiful spouse”). 
beautiful people as more competent and more socially graceful than their less attractive peers.13  
Physically attractive individuals tend to have more friends, more sex, and more money than those 
who lack such beauty.14  
 
 This “beauty advantage” often becomes particularly pronounced at work.  Employers 
tend to hire physically attractive job candidates more frequently than their less attractive peers, 
and tend to offer higher starting salaries to these more attractive individuals.15  Once on the job, 
attractive employees continue to garner benefits:  They tend to receive more favorable 
performance reviews,16 receive higher pay,17 and receive promotions at a more frequent rate.18  
Attractive employees thus seem to climb the corporate ladder more quickly than their peers, 
placing one (well manicured) foot in front of the other in a manner that may seem effortless to 
the casual observer. 
 
This prevailing wisdom makes it easy to dismiss complaints like those lodged by Ms. 
Nelson – complaints that her physical beauty placed her at a disadvantage in the workplace, and 
ultimately led to her termination.  Yet in both Nelson and in other similar cases, female 
employees have tried to allege unlawful gender discrimination on precisely this basis, arguing 
that they received adverse treatment for being too attractive for their jobs.  
 
A. Nelson v. Knight:  Fired for Being “Too Hot” for Her Job? 
 
In 1999, Melissa Nelson began working as a dental hygienist for Iowa dentist James 
Knight.19  Over the course of the next decade, Nelson and Knight enjoyed a collegial 
relationship:  Nelson apparently performed her work duties well, and Knight treated Nelson with 
respect and integrity.20  According to Nelson, however, in or around 2009, her relationship with 
Dr. Knight underwent changes.21  Knight began to complain about the clothing that Nelson wore 
to work, describing it as too tight, revealing, and “distracting.”22  He told Nelson that it was “not 
good for [him] see [Nelson] wearing things that accentuate her body.”23  Knight and Nelson also 
began sending text messages to each other regarding both work and personal matters.24  Both 
parties apparently played a role in initiating these text messages, and neither ever objected to the 
other’s text messages.25  While many of these messages involved innocuous issues, such as 
discussions regarding their children’s activities, the messages eventually took on a more sexual 
13 See Kimmel, supra note 11. 
14 See id.; see also Brown, supra note 11, at 57 (citations omitted). 
15 See Toledano, surpa note 11 at 684, 694. (citations omitted) 
16 See id. at 694 (citation omitted). 
17 See Kimmel, supra note 11 (citing one economic study that found a “5 percent bonus” for employees who fall 
within the top third of the “looks department” (as assessed by a set of observers), as compared to a 7 to 9% penalty 
for those in the bottom 9%). 
18 See Toledano, supra note 11, at 684 (citation omitted). 
19 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 65. 
20 See id.   
21 See id. 
22 Id. (quotations in original).  
23 Id. 
24 See id.   
25 See id.   
tone.26  Knight told Nelson that “if she ever saw his pants bulging, she would know her clothing 
was too revealing.”27  He texted Nelson to ask how often she experienced orgasms.28  When 
Nelson once commented regarding the infrequency in her sex life, Knight told her “[t]hat’s like 
having a Lamborghini in the garage and never driving it.”29  While Knight initiated the sexual 
content in these exchanges, Nelson apparently never asked Knight not to text her, and never 
indicated that she was offended by these conversations.30  Nelson also admitted that she once 
texted Knight to tell him that “[t]he only reason I stay is because of you,”31 and admitted that a 
coworker was jealous of the manner in which Nelson and Knight got along.32 
 
Dr. Knight’s wife (who also worked in her husband’s dental practice) eventually 
discovered that her husband and Nelson had been texting each other.33  Stating that she viewed 
Nelson as “a big threat to our marriage,” Mrs. Knight demanded that her husband terminate 
Nelson’s employment.34  After considering his wife’s request and conferring with their pastor, 
Dr. Knight eventually fired Nelson, telling Nelson that “their relationship had become a 
detriment to [his] family and that for the best interest of [himself] and his family and Nelson and 
her family, the two of them should not work together.”35  When later pressed by Nelson’s 
husband, Dr. Knight admitted that Nelson was “the best dental assistant that he ever had,”36 and 
acknowledged that Nelson “had not done anything wrong or inappropriate.”37  He also said that 
he was “worried he was getting to personally attached to [Nelson], and that he “feared he would 
try to have an affair with her down the road if he did not fire her.”38 
 
Nelson sued Knight under Section 216.6(1)(a) of the Iowa Code, which prohibits an 
employer from discharging any employee because of that employee’s sex.39  Just as under the 
comparable antidiscrimination language found within Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”),40 the court noted that its inquiry involved determining whether sex was “a 
motivating factor” in any adverse action taken against the plaintiff.41  Knight argued that 
Nelson’s sex was not a motivating factor in her termination:  He said that the nature of his 
relationship with Nelson and the threat this relationship imposed on his marriage, and not 
26 See id. at 65-66. 
27 Id. at 66. 
28 See id. 
29 Id.  
30 See id. at 65; see also id. at 66.  
31 Id. at 65-66. 
32 See id. at 65. 
33 Id.at 66. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
39 See id. at 67 (citation omitted).  As discussed in greater detail below, Nelson only asserted a gender discrimination 
claim related to her termination.  See infra notes 63-65, 100-15 and accompanying text.  She did not assert any claim 
of sexual harassment, despite the sexual and often graphic nature of Knight’s texts to her.  See id. 
40 The Nelson court noted that in evaluating discrimination claims under Iowa Code Chapter 216, it looks to federal 
law as guidance, including Title VII. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 67 (citation omitted). 
41 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (stating that “[g]enerally, an employer engages in unlawful sex 
discrimination when the employer takes adverse action against an employee and sex is a motivating factor in the 
employer’s decision”). 
Nelson’s gender, were his motivations for terminating her employment.42  Nelson, in contrast, 
adopted the view that neither this relationship nor the alleged threat it imposed would have 
existed if she had not been a woman.43 
 
In December 2012 and July 2013, the Iowa Supreme Court issued decisions affirming 
summary judgment for Dr. Knight.44  In rendering these decisions, the Iowa Supreme Court drew 
upon cases that previously had declined to find gender discrimination when employers had fired 
female employees who were involved in consensual personal relationships that may have 
triggered some jealousy in others.45  According to the court, it did not matter that the 
relationships (and the jealousy that resulted) likely would not have existed if the plaintiffs had 
been male.46  In one Eighth Circuit case relied upon by the court, for example, a male business 
owner had fired a female employee because the owner’s wife saw this employee as a threat to 
her marriage.47  Citing authority that previously had recognized that “sexual favoritism” does not 
violate Title VII,48 the court in this Eighth Circuit case had opined that if instances of sexual 
favoritism did not violate Title VII (i.e., because such decisions resulted from conduct and not 
gender), then treating an employee unfavorably because of this type of special relationship 
likewise would not violate the law.49  The Eighth Circuit thus had held that employment 
decisions which are made based upon consensual sexual relationships should not be seen as 
flowing from the gender of the parties, but rather as flowing from the relevant employees’ 
conduct.50   
 
While the district court in Nelson had deemed this Eighth Circuit precedent persuasive, 
Nelson attempted to distinguish her situation.  In this Eighth Circuit case, Nelson argued, the 
plaintiff-employee had played an active role in creating and encouraging the threatening 
relationship with her employer, pinching his rear end, and writing him notes of a sexual and 
intimate nature.51  Nelson, in contrast, claimed that she had done nothing to create her precarious 
workplace situation, never flirting with Knight or initiating any sort of sexual or intimate 
42 See id. 
43 See id.  
44 As described in greater detail below, see infra notes 185-203 and accompanying text, the court initially issued a 
decision in December 2012, and then issued another opinion in July 2013 which withdrew the court’s first opinion 
and which was substituted as the opinion of the court.. While the differences between the two opinions issued by the 
court are discussed in greater detail below, the analysis in this section focuses on the court’s reasoning in its second, 
July 2013 opinion, since that remains the opinion of record. 
45 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 67-68 (citations omitted). 
46 See id. at 67, 70. 
47 See id. at 67-68 (citing Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 905-06 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
48 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 68 (citation omitted)); see also id. at 79 n.13 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (citing 
precedent holding that “[Romantically motivated] favoritism is not based on a belief that women are better workers, 
or otherwise deserve to be treated better, than men; indeed, it is entirely consistent with the opposite opinion”) 
(quotations and parentheticals in original) (citations omitted). 
49 See id. at 68.  This line of cases assumed, however, that the conduct in question did not result from unwelcome 
sexual advances or other aspects of a hostile work environment.  See id. (citations omitted). 
50 See id. at 68 (citations omitted). 
51 See id. at 67-68 (citations omitted). 
relationship with him.52  In Nelson’s eyes, she was guilty of little more than simply “exist[ing] as 
a female” at work.53   
 
The court, however, rejected Nelson’s argument.54  In upholding the district court’s 
granting of summary judgment for Dr. Knight, the court found a distinction between an 
employment decision based upon a personal relationship like that between Knight and Nelson 
(assuming that there was no coercion or “quid pro quo” involved), and a decision based upon 
gender itself.55  According to the court, this distinction would exist even when the “personal 
relationship” at issue would not have arisen had the employee been of the opposite gender.56  In 
other words, even if Knight likely would not have developed a personal relationship with Nelson 
had she been a male employee – and even if Knight’s wife may not have become jealous of a 
close relationship between her husband and a male employee – a termination based upon this 
relationship and the jealous it caused was not the same as termination based upon gender.   
 
The Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court, concurring in the result, elaborated on this 
point, asserting that while “differential treatment based on an employee’s status as a woman 
constitutes sex discrimination… differential treatment on account of conduct resulting from the 
sexual affiliations of an employee does not form the basis of a sex-discrimination claim.57  The 
Chief Justice thus noted that “an adverse employment consequence experienced by an employee 
because of a voluntary, romantic relationship does not form the basis of a sex-discrimination 
suit,”58 and emphasized that this rule extended beyond relationships with actual sexual intimacy, 
also including “consensual affiliations involving sexually suggestive conduct.”59  Applying this 
analysis to the instant case, the Chief Justice found that while “the absence of sexually 
suggestive behavior on the part of Nelson… does factually distinguish this case from [cases 
52 See id. at 65. 
53 Id. at 69; see also id. (framing the question for the court as “whether an employee who has not engaged in 
flirtatious conduct may be lawfully terminated simply because  the boss’s spouse views the relationship between the 
boss and the employee as a threat to her marriage”) (emphasis added).  The court also discussed an Eleventh Circuit 
opinion, Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., where a male business owner terminated a female employee 
who worked on the same crew as the business owner’s son, after the wife of this son became jealous of the female 
employee. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 68-69 (citing Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902, 
903-05 (11th Cir. 1990)).  Just as Nelson claimed in her case, the female employee in Platner had not played an 
active role in fostering anyone’s jealousy, Platner, supra note 53, at 903-05, yet the Eleventh Circuit still declined to 
find the defendant liable for gender discrimination.  Id. at 905 (“It is evident that Thomas, faced with a seemingly 
insoluble conflict within his family, felt he had to make a choice as to which employee to keep.  He opted to place 
the burden… on Platner, to whom he was not related…. [T]he ultimate basis for Platner’s dismissal was not gender 
but simply favoritism for a close relative”). 
54 See id. at 70-73.   
55 See id. at 70, 73; see also id. at 75 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (noting that “differential treatment based on an 
employee’s status as a woman constitutes sex discrimination, while differential treatment on account of conduct 
resulting from the sexual affiliations of an employee does not form the basis of a sex-discrimination claim”) (citation 
omitted). 
56 See id. at 67; see also id. at 70. 
57 Id. at 75 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
58 Id. (Cady, C.J. concurring) (citation omitted) 
59 Id. at 75-76 (Cady, C.J. concurring) (citations omitted); see also id. at 76 (Cady, C.J. concurring) (“When 
employees are terminated due to consensual, romantic or sexually suggestive relationships with their supervisors, 
courts generally conclude the reason does not amount to sex discrimination….”). 
rejecting sex discrimination claims based on a consensual, romantic relationship…],”60 the threat 
to the Knight’s marriage here still resulted from the consensual personal relationship between 
Nelson and Dr. Knight.61  Accordingly, he found no evidence indicating that either the 
relationship between Knight and Nelson or the decision to terminate Nelson flowed from gender-
based animus.62 
 
Significantly, both the Majority and Concurring justices in Nelson took great pains to 
emphasize the very limited nature of their decision (particularly in their second, July 2013 
opinion).63  For example, the court repeatedly highlighted Nelson’s failure to assert a sexual 
harassment claim in this case – a decision that the court seemed to find surprising given the 
nature of Dr. Knight’s graphic communications with Nelson.64  Indeed, at several points 
throughout the opinion, the court implied that had Nelson alleged sexual harassment, the court 
might have reached a different conclusion in this case.65   
 
Moreover, in finding no gender discrimination related to Nelson’s termination, the court 
made much of the consensual nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson, including 
within both the Majority and Concurring opinion reams of references to this consensual 
relationship, and specifically noting that it would have reached a different conclusion had 
Nelson’s relationship with Knight not been consensual.66  The Chief Justice characterized the 
60 Id. at 79 (Cady, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 80 (concur) (emphasizing that “a critical aspect of the entire 
analysis centers on the consensual and voluntary nature of the personal relationship”) 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 65 (stating, in opinion’s opening lines, “[w]e emphasize the limits of our decision”). 
64 See id. at 72 n.7 (observing that while the “record indicates that Dr. Knight made a number of inappropriate 
comments toward Nelson that are of a type often seen in sexual harassment cases…, Nelson does not allege… that 
she was a victim of sexual harassment”); see also id. at 65 (“The employee did not bring a sexual harassment or 
hostile environment claim; we are not deciding how such a claim would have been resolved in this or any other 
case”); see also id. at 67 (citation omitted) (“Nelson does not contend that her employer committed sexual 
harassment”); id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (acknowledging that Knight’s comments would commonly be 
viewed as inappropriate in most any setting and, for sure, beyond the reasonable parameters of workplace 
interaction,” but noting that “they nevertheless were an undeniable part of the consensual personal relationship 
enjoyed by Nelson and Dr. Knight”). 
65 See id. at 65 (clarifying that the court was not deciding how a sexual harassment or hostile work environment 
claim would be resolved on these facts); see also id. at 72 n.7 (indicating that inappropriate comments like those 
made by Knight in this case frequently support sexual harassment claims).  Other observers of this case more 
explicitly questioned Nelson’s decision not to allege harassment in this case in the wake of the court’s decisions.  
See Fired just for being ‘too hot’ is discrimination, IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN, Jan. 3, 2013 (responding to initial 
opinion issued by Iowa Supreme Court, stating “we can’t understand why Nelson filed suit based on gender 
discrimination rather than sexual harassment.  It seems she could have made a stronger case for Knight having 
created a hostile work environment”). 
66 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 64 (“We emphasize the limits of our decision.  The employee did not bring a sexual 
harassment or hostile work environment claim; we are not deciding how such a claim would have been resolved in 
this or any other case”); id. at  65 (observing that “[b]oth parties initiated texting” and that “[n]either objected to the 
other’s texting”); id . at 66 (relaying Nelson’s admission that the does not remember ever telling Dr. Knight not to 
text her or indicating that she found his texts offensive); id. at 67 (citing precedent which has held that “an employer 
does not engage in unlawful gender discrimination by discharging a female employee who is involved in a 
consensual relationship that has triggered personal jealousy”) (emphasis added); id. at 70 (finding a distinction 
between a decisions based upon gender and “an isolated employment decision based on personal relations (assuming 
no coercion or quid pro quo”) (emphasis added); id. (citing federal caselaw holding that “adverse employment 
action stemming from a consensual workplace relationship (absent sexual harassment) is not actionable under Title 
consensual nature of this relationship as “a critical aspect of the [court’s] entire analysis,”67 
deeming “the consensual aspect of the relationship” to be “pivotal to the analysis of the claim of 
discrimination based on a personal relationship.”68  The court made clear that it was this 
consensual relationship – conduct on the part of both Knight and Nelson – that formed the basis 
for Nelson’s termination, and not merely Nelson’s gender or “existence” as a female.69  Thus, 
neither Nelson’s appearance nor her gender alone were enough to get her fired; rather, it was the 
manifestation of that attractive, feminine appearance into a consensual personal relationship with 
Dr. Knight – a relationship that evoked jealousy in Knight’s wife – that led to her termination. 
 
B. Other Employees Who Have Claimed to be “Too Hot” for their Jobs 
 
 Nelson is not alone in claiming to have suffered adverse treatment at work due to her 
attractive appearance.  Indeed, despite the fact that Nelson’s claim seemed to fly in the face of 
extensive research that has shown the workplace advantages of physical beauty,70 other 
employees similarly have claimed to have experienced adverse treatment due to their good looks.  
In 2010, for example, a banker named Debrahlee Lorenzana was fired from her position 
Citibank, a termination that Lorenzana claims was due to her curvaceous figure and her 
propensity to dress in a manner that accentuated her body.71  In the lawsuit that she filed against 
her former employer (which ultimately was dismissed due to the presence of an arbitration 
VII”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); id. at 75 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (articulating the “general legal 
principle that an adverse employment consequence experienced by an employee because of a voluntary, romantic 
relationship does not form the basis of a sex discrimination suit,” whether relationship involves sexual intimacy or 
simply sexually-suggestive conduct) (emphasis added) (citations omitted);  id. at 76  (Cady, C.J., concurring) 
(stating that “[w]hen employees are terminated due to consensual, romantic or sexually suggestive relationships with 
their supervisors, courts generally conclude the reason does not amount to sex discrimination because the adverse 
consequence is based upon sexual activity rather than gender”) (emphasis added); id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring) 
(finding that “[t]he fact of the matter is Nelson was terminated because of the activities of her consensual personal 
relationship with her employer, not because of her gender”) (emphasis added); id. (Cady, C.J., concurring) 
(referencing the “consensual personal relationship” between Knight and Nelson and observing that this relationship 
“extended well beyond the workplace”); id. (Cady, C.J., concurring) (characterizing Knight’s sexual banter as “an 
undeniable part of the consensual personal relationship enjoyed by Nelson and Dr. Knight”); id. at 79 (Cady, C.J., 
concurring) (holding that “a sex discrimination claim predicated on physical appearance accompanied by a 
consensual personal relationship between the employee and employer requires proof that the physical appearance of 
the plaintiff was the gender-based reason for the adverse employment action’”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); 
id. at 79-80 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (finding that “[t]he relationship… included enough activity and conduct to 
support a determination… that Nelson was terminated as a response to the consensual personal relationship she 
maintained with Dr. Knight,” and that “there was insufficient evidence tending to show that Nelson’s status as a 
woman also was a motivating reason”); id. at 80 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (“It is important to observe that a critical 
aspect of the entire analysis centers on the consensual and voluntary nature of the personal relationship”); id. (Cady, 
C.J., concurring) (stating that “the consensual aspect of the relationship is pivotal to the analysis of the claim of 
discrimination based on a personal relationship,: and holding that “[i]n this case, it is undisputed the relationship was 
consensual”); id. at 80-81 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (finding that  “there was insufficient evidence offered by Nelson 
in light of the undisputed evidence of a consensual personal relationship that would permit a reasonable fact finder 
to conclude… that Dr. Knight terminated Nelson based on her status as a woman”). 
67 Id. at 80 (Cady, C.J., concurring). 
68 Id. at 80-81 (Cady, C.J., concurring). 
69 See id. at 67, 70, 73. 
70 See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. 
71 See Complaint, Lorenzana v. Citigroup Inc., No. 09116382, 2009 WL 4241578 (N.Y. Sup. Nov. 20, 2009) 
(hereinafter “Lorenzana Complaint”), at ¶ 6;  see also Ed Pilkington, New York banker claims she was fired for 
being too attractive, THE GUARDIAN, June 4, 2010; Corbett, supra note 11, at 615-622 (citations omitted). 
agreement),72 Lorenzana claimed that her superiors had asked her to refrain from wearing 
various items of clothing (including turtleneck tops, pencil skirts, fitted business suits, or other 
tailored clothing) because “as a result of the shape of her figure, such clothes were purportedly 
‘too distracting’ for her male colleagues and supervisors to bear.”73  Moreover, Lorenzana 
alleged that, in response to her complaints that other female employees wore these prohibited 
clothing items, Citigroup management had advised Lorenzana that the other female employees 
could wear what they wished because “[their] general unattractiveness rendered moot their 
sartorial choices,”74 while Lorenzana could not allow her “shapeliness” to be “heightened by 
beautifully tailored clothing.”75 
 
Similarly, in Willingham v. Regions Bank,76 the plaintiff – also an attractive female 
banker – claimed to have been terminated due to her attractive appearance and argued that her 
termination constituted gender discrimination.77  Willingham’s employer, in contrast, claimed 
that she was terminated for violating her company’s Code of Conduct, after she appeared in a 
publication as “Ms. Cruzin’ South August 2008,” appeared both on the cover and in photos 
wearing a bikini and sitting on motorcycles and cars, and then distributed copies of this magazine 
at work.78  In alleging that her termination resulted from sex discrimination,79 Willingham 
argued, inter alia, that the bank treated her in a different, more negative manner than a similarly-
situated male employee, and she specifically pointed to a photograph of a male employee who 
had not been fired after appearing shirtless and dressed in skimpy running shorts on a web site 
related to a road race.80  The court, however, rejected her claim, granting summary judgment in 
favor of the bank.81 
 
 In 2010, Amy-Erin Blakely, a former executive at a nonprofit organization called The 
Devereux Foundation, sued her former employer for gender discrimination after her termination 
by the nonprofit.82  Prior to her termination, Blakely had filed two internal grievances against her 
employer alleging adverse treatment due to her attractive physical appearance.83  Among her 
allegations, Blakely claimed that, prior to her termination, she had been told that other 
employees could not concentrate in meetings with her “because all they saw were her ‘big 
breasts’”;84 that she had been nicknamed “Big Tittie Baby”;85 that a high-level executive wanted 
72 See Corbett, supra note 11, at 620 (citations omitted); see also Docket Entry, Lorenzana v. Citigroup Inc., Feb. 2, 
2010.  
73 Lorenzana Complaint, supra note 71, at ¶ 6 (internal quotations and emphasis in original); see also Pilkington, 
supra note 71. 
74 Lorenzana Complaint, supra note 71, at ¶ 7. 
75 Id. 
76 Willingham v. Regions Bank, No. 2:09-cv-02289, 2010 WL 2650727, at *1-3 (W.D. Tenn. July 1, 2010). 
77 See id. at *1-2. 
78 See id.  
79 See id. at *2. 
80 See id. at *4-6 (citations omitted). 
81 See id. at *1, *3-7 (citations omitted). 
82 See Lisa Johnson Mandell, Amy-Erin Blakely Busts Devereux Foundation With Large Breasts Lawsuit (Nov. 17, 
2010), available at http://jobs.aol.com/articles/2010/11/17/amy-erin-blakely-busts-devereux-foundation-with-large-
breasts-la/. 
83 See id. 
84 Id. (internal quotations in original). 
85 Id. (quotations in original). 
to play tennis with her so he could see her in a tennis skirt and “see her big titties bouncing 
around”;86 and that she was “too sensual” for promotion into the position of executive director, 
among other comments.87 (The parties eventually settled this case after it was removed to federal 
court.)88 
 
 Notably, these types of claims by female plaintiffs alleging adverse treatment due to their 
attractive physical appearance seem not to be limited to the corporate workplace.  Even 
employees who work at job sites where one would expect tolerance (and perhaps even a 
preference) for physical attractiveness or sensual attire have complained of discrimination based 
upon their good looks.  In 2012, for example, a data entry employee at a wholesale lingerie 
company claimed to have been fired one week into her employment due to her busty figure and 
allegedly racy attire.89  The employee claimed that she was asked to tape her breasts down to 
make them look smaller, and that she was told that she was “just too hot for this office”90 – 
despite her assertion that her wardrobe was “appropriate for a business that sells thongs with 
hearts placed in the female genital area and boy shorts for women that say ‘hot’ in the buttocks 
area.”91  Similarly, in 2013, a New York yoga teacher claimed that she was fired from a 
husband-and-wife owned chiropractic clinic where she worked after the husband told the 
employee that “his wife might become jealous of her on account of being ‘too cute.’”92  (Adding 
an additional twist to this tale, the wife was herself a former Playboy Playmate.)93 
 
What is interesting about all of these claims is the double-edged sword that they 
illustrate:  In many cases, these female plaintiffs – like other women in the workplace – may 
garner a wealth of benefits from their attractive physical appearance, in terms of hiring, 
promotion, compensation, and other feedback.94  Yet their attractiveness also can create 
problems for them at work, placing them – as one commentator has observed – “between a rock 
and a hard place... [i]nsulted and not hired if they aren’t attractive, fired if they are too 
attractive.”95  Compounding the problem, once these women are faced with this alleged 
unfairness at work – purportedly receiving adverse treatment due to their appearance – they may 
86 Id. (quotations in original). 
87 Id. (quotations in original). 
88 See Notice of Removal, Blakely v. The Devereaux Found., Inc., No. 6:10-cv-01808-MSS-KRS, M.D. Fl. (Dec. 6, 
2010); see also Mediation Report, Blakely, No. 6:10-cv-01808-MSS-KRS, M.D. Fl. (Aug. 16, 2011); Order of 
Dismissal With Prejudice, No. 6:10-cv-01808-MSS-KRS, M.D. Fl. (Sept. 13, 2011). 
89 See Lauren Odes, Former Native Intimates Employee, Claims She Was Fired Over ‘Too Hot’ Appearance,  HUFF 
POST STYLE, May 22, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/22/lauren-odes-native-intimates-
fired_n_1535498.html (hereinafter “Odes HUFF POST STYLE”); see also Chris Francescani, Fired for Being “too 
hot,” New Jersey woman claims, May 21, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/21/us-
newyork-lingerie-hot-idUSBRE84K18220120521. 
90 Odes HUFF POST STYLE, supra note 89 (quotation in original). 
91 See Francescani, supra note 89 (internal quotations omitted). 
92 See Marisa Meltzer, You’re Cute and Fired, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 29, 2013.  
93 See Lorena Mongelli and Bruce Golding, ‘Fired for being too cute” by ex-Playmate boss, NEW YORK POST, Nov. 
20, 2013.  
94 See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. 
95 Pepper Schwartz, Fired because a man can’t control himself, CNN.COM, July 16, 2013, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/opinion/schwartz-fired-looks/. 
receive less sympathy from their peers and from the public due to their physical beauty.96  
Observers “may or may not be moved by a claim that can be restated as ‘Don’t hate me because 
I’m beautiful.’”97  In this respect, attractive employees may see the negative consequences of 
their physical appearance as eventually outweighing the benefits that their appearance can 
produce. 
 
II.  ANOTHER PATH?  HOW NELSON AND OTHER “ATTRACTIVE 
EMPLOYEES” MIGHT PREVAIL IN SIMILAR CASES 
 
Cases like Nelson thus present quite a puzzle:  If countless studies establish that attractive 
employees enjoy significant advantages at work,98 how can Nelson and her counterparts claim 
that their attractive looks somehow undermined their jobs?   While Nelson’s straightforward 
theory of gender discrimination – her theory that she “did not do anything to get herself fired 
except exist as a female”99 – did not lead to victory, there are other paths that she (and others like 
her) might successfully pursue if they believe that they were fired as a result of their good looks. 
 
A. The Missing Harassment Claim as One Possible Route to Future Success 
 
One obvious route that was available to Ms. Nelson – yet one that she elected not to 
pursue – was a sexual harassment claim against Dr. Knight.  Knight’s behavior seemed to 
provide ample ammunition for a viable sexual harassment claim.  As discussed above, he 
engaged in explicit, seemingly one-sided sexual banter with Nelson, making suggestive 
comments regarding her clothing and her sex life, and describing to Nelson in graphic terms the 
extent to which she made him feel sexually aroused.100  Yet despite this evidence, Nelson’s 
counsel chose not to pursue a harassment theory, sticking only to a theory of gender 
discrimination.101  This failure to allege harassment allowed the Iowa Supreme Court repeatedly 
to characterize the relationship between Knight and Nelson as “consensual” in nature,102 and led 
the court specifically to observe that the lack of a harassment claim limited its decision in this 
case.103  From this perspective, Nelson’s loss may appear more as an example of a missed 
opportunity by her attorney than as a misinterpretation of the law by the court. 
 
To prevail in a sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff generally must show that she either 
was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment that was sufficiently severe and pervasive to 
alter the terms and conditions of employment, or that she suffered some “tangible employment 
96 See Corbett, supra note 11, at 632-33 (noting that “[i]f Lorenzana were an unattractive person suing for unfair 
termination, she likely would evoke sympathy, but, ironically, not nearly as much publicity.  However, with an 
attractive woman, this story may have the opposite effect.”) 
97 Id. (citation omitted) (quotations in original). 
98 See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. 
99 Nelson, supra note 2, at 69. 
100 See supra notes 22-23, 27-29 and accompanying text (describing Knight’s sexually graphic communications with 
Nelson); see also Nelson, supra note 2, at 72 n.7 (noting that “Dr. Knight made a number of inappropriate comments 
toward Nelson that are of a type often seen in sexual harassment cases”).  
101 See supra notes 64-65 (collecting citations to Nelson’s decision not to bring a harassment claim). 
102 See supra notes 66-69 (collecting references to the consensual nature of the relationship between Knight and 
Nelson). 
103 See supra notes 64-65 (collecting references where court noted Nelson’s failure to allege sexual harassment and 
where court thus emphasized the limited nature of its decision). 
action” (i.e., a termination, demotion, etc.) as a result of her failure to submit to a superior’s 
sexual demands.104  Here, much of Dr. Knight’s undisputed conduct seems to provide an ample 
basis for both types of sexual harassment:  Nelson either could argue that Knight’s sexually 
explicit texts and comments created a hostile work environment, or she could claim that, 
regardless of whatever atmosphere his comments created, her termination resulted from her 
rebuff of his overtures.105  Yet Nelson never alleged, in either her formal court filings or any 
press statements, that Dr. Knight’s conduct constituted sexual harassment.106 
 
So why did Nelson refrain from bringing this claim?  As the court repeatedly noted, 
Nelson never objected to Knight’s overtures, and apparently viewed her close and personal 
relationship with Knight as consensual in nature.107  Nelson’s own attorney stated that Nelson 
declined to bring a harassment claim “because Knight’s conduct might not have risen to that 
level and didn’t particularly offend [Nelson].”108  While Nelson felt “shocked” and “betrayed” 
by Knight’s conduct, she chalked these exchanges up to “social[] awkward[ness]” on Knight’s 
part, as opposed to harassment.109  Moreover, while Knight adopted the role of the initiator of 
these sex-fueled communications, with Nelson maintaining a more passive role – receiving his 
graphic overtures but apparently never responding with any sexual comments of her own110 – she 
never took any steps to terminate these communications (including the most obvious, asking 
Knight to stop).111   
 
Of course, even Nelson’s “consent” to these conversations (or, at a minimum, her failure 
explicitly to object) should not necessarily have stymied a harassment claim.  Where, as here, 
there is a significant power differential between the parties in a relationship, courts may be 
104 See, e.g., Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-53 (1998) (citations omitted). 
105 See id.; see also supra notes 22-23, 27-29 and accompanying text (describing Knight’s communications with 
Nelson). 
106 See supra note 64 and associated text (collecting references regarding Nelson’s failure to assert a sexual 
harassment claim). 
107 See supra notes 25, 30-32, 66-69. 
108 Firing just for being ‘too hot’ is discrimination, supra note 65; see also ‘Irresistible’ Iowa Woman Fired For 
Being Too Sexy, BUSINESS INSIDER, Dec. 25, 2012, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/melissa-nelson-
fired-for-being-too-sexy-2012-12 (noting that “Nelson did not consider Knight’s behavior to be sexual 
harassment”); Another View:  Iowa court shows that equality between the sexes really isn’t, DES MOINES REGISTER, 
Jan. 2, 2013 (stating that Nelson’s case “did not met guidelines for ‘a hostile work environment’ or ‘abusive 
atmosphere’”); Top Iowa court’s do-over:  ‘Irresistible employee’ fired legally for personal reasons, DES MOINES 
REGISTER, July 13., 2013 (noting the court’s emphasis that  Nelson’s lawsuit “stressed improper behavior by Knight 
but alleged sexual discrimination and not harassment). 
109 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 66.  Dr. Knight’s attorney has echoed this view, stating that Nelson admitted during a 
deposition that she never felt harassed, never was offended, and that she respected Dr. Knight.  See Interview with 
Stuart Cochrane, attorney for James H. Knight (May 29, 2014).  Indeed, according to Nelson’s attorney, Nelson did 
not allege sexual harassment because in her view “Knights conduct may not have risen to that level and didn’t 
particularly offend [Nelson].”  Firing just for being ‘too hot’ is discrimination, supra note 65; see also Interview 
with Paige Fiedler, attorney for Melissa Nelson (June 2, 2014) (confirming that Nelson felt shocked and betrayed by 
Knight’s conduct but did not view it as harassment).  
110 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 65-66. 
111 See id. at 66 (observing that “Nelson does not remember ever telling Dr. Knight not to text her or telling him that 
she was offended”); see also id. at 65-66 (noting that Nelson once texted D. Knight that “[t]he only reason I stay is 
because of you”) (quotations and parenthetical in original). 
skeptical of the “consensual” nature of that relationship.112  At least one court has recognized 
that a plaintiff reasonably may refrain from telling a supervisor that his sexual comments are 
unwelcome if he or she fears that objecting might cost the plaintiff his/her job, citing the 
“disparity of power between a lower-level… employee and the owner of the business.”113  
Indeed, in rendering his concurring opinion in this case, the Chief Justice acknowledged that a 
“personal relationship between an employer and subordinate can give rise to subtle issues of 
power and control that may make the line between consensual and submissive relationships 
difficult to draw.”114  In this case, however, the Chief Justice noted that “Nelson made no legal 
or factual claim that a relationship with Dr. Knight was submissive, objectionable, or harassing 
in any way, and there was no evidence in the record to hint the relationship was not jointly 
pursued.”115 
 
While Nelson elected not to pursue a sexual harassment claim in this case, other plaintiffs 
alleging adverse treatment due to their attractive physical appearance perhaps would have a basis 
for asserting this theory as part of a wrongful termination claim.  As the Nelson court observed, 
the consensual nature of Knight and Nelson’s sexually charged (but unconsummated) 
relationship was rather unusual.116  In many cases, the comments directed toward a plaintiff who 
claims to have been “too attractive” for a workplace likely will involve the sort of graphic and/or 
sexually charged language that can support a claim of sexual harassment.117    Moreover, most 
employees receiving such sexually graphic communications from an employer likely would 
object to such comments – either explicitly at the time or, at least, by later arguing that a 
112 See, e.g. Simmons v. Miami Valley Trotting, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-478, 2006 WL 1000076, at *1, *6 (S.D. Ohio 
Apr. 14, 2006); Hernandez v. Miranda Velez, No. 92-2701 (JAF), 1994 WL 394855, at *1, *4 (D. Puerto Rico July 
20, 1994) (noting that “abuse of power in the supervisory-underling relationship is the essence of the ‘classic’ 
definition of sexual harassment in any setting”) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Billie Wright 
Dziech, Robert W. Dzeich & Donald B. Horde, ‘Consensual’ or Submissive Relationships:  The Second-Best Kept 
Secret, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 83, 85 (1999) (arging that “consent cannot exist in conjunction with unequal 
distribution of authority,” and that “power and status disparities place subordinated in untenable positions from 
which some lack the fortitude and support to extricate themselves….”); but see, e.g., Olsen v. Marshall Ilsley Corp., 
No. 99–C–0774–C, 2000 WL 34233699, at *1, *17 (W.D. Wisc. Sept. 7, 2000) (disputing notion that relationship 
between subordinate and supervisor establishes conclusive evidence of sexual harassment and emphasizing need to 
show “unwilling consent” to establish harassment claim) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
113 See Simmons, supra note 112, at *6.  
114 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 80 (Cady, C.J. concurring) (citations omitted). 
115 See supra notes 66-69  and accompanying text (collecting references to consensual nature of the relationship 
between Knight and Nelson).  Notably, despite the wealth of evidence indicating the consensual nature of the 
relationship between Knight and Nelson, Nelson did endeavor to distinguish her situation from those in other cases 
involving consensual workplace relationships between (terminated) employees and their bosses.  In at least one 
other case cited by the court, the terminated plaintiff had played an active role in creating the jealousy-inducing 
relationship (for example, by pinching her boss’s rear and by writing notes of a sexual nature to the owner and 
leaving them in locations where others could find them.)  See Nelson, supra note 2, at 67-68 (citations omitted).  
Nelson, in contrast, argued that she never flirted with Dr. Knight or encouraged his overtures, see id. at 65, arguing 
that “she did not do anything to get herself fired except exist as a female.”  Id. at 69 (internal quotations omitted). 
116 See supra notes 64-65.  At least one local editorial regarding this case commented on the strangeness of Nelson’s 
failure to bring a sexual harassment claim based upon this set of facts, with the authors stating that they “[couldn’t] 
understand why Nelson filed suit based on gender discrimination rather than sexual harassment…,” and opining that 
“she could have made a stronger case for Knight having created a hostile work environment.”  Fired for being ‘too 
hot’ is discrimination, supra note 65. 
117 See, e.g., supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (discussing sexually graphic comments made to former 
nonprofit executive Amy-Erin Blakely). 
subordinate position in the workplace prevented her from raising such contemporaneous 
objections.118  Thus, even if other plaintiffs similarly situated to Nelson might not prevail in 
alleging gender discrimination based upon an employer firing them due to their (attractive) 
physical appearance, most likely would have a strong basis for characterizing their termination 
and/or any other adverse action as an example of unlawful sexual harassment. 
 
B. The Attractive Employee as a Victim of Gender Stereotyping:  Applying 
Price Waterhouse to the “Too Hot” Employee 
 
While some plaintiffs similarly-situated to Nelson might find success simply by adding 
an allegation of sexual harassment to their Complaints, others may also wish to pursue gender 
discrimination claims separate from any allegations of harassment.  Success also might be 
possible for this group of plaintiffs, under an interpretation of antidiscrimination law that deals 
with “sex stereotyping” at work. 
 
Until the late 1980’s, the courts interpreted “sex discrimination” under Title VII119 in a 
fairly straightforward manner, construing the term “sex” in Title VII to apply only to anatomical 
sex, and not to gender (i.e., whether someone demonstrates qualities that society deems 
masculine or feminine).120  In 1989, however, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,121 finding for the very first time that sex stereotyping 
in the workplace was a prohibited form of sex discrimination.122 
 
The circumstances under which Price Waterhouse arose present an interesting contrast to 
Nelson.  Ann Hopkins had been serving as a Senior Manager in an office of Price Waterhouse, 
the accounting firm, when she was proposed for partnership in 1982.123  During the firm’s 
consideration of her partnership, Hopkins’ colleagues praised her character and her many 
professional accomplishments,124 while simultaneously criticizing some of her personality 
traits.125  For example, some partners expressed concern about Hopkins’ “aggressiveness” and 
“abrasiveness” when dealing with staff.126  One partner described Hopkins as “macho,” and 
another suggested that she “overcompensated for being a woman.”127  Hopkins was told that she 
should “take a course as charm school,”128 and was advised to “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”129  
118 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. 
119 Title VII bars employers from depriving individuals of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
impacting an individual’s employment because of that individual’ sex, among other protected characteristics.  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). 
120 See Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for 
Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 394 396 (2001) (citations omitted). 
121 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
122 See id. at 250-51. 
123 See id. at 231-32. 
124 See id. at 234 
125 See id. at 234-35. 
126 Id. at 234. 
127 Id. at 235 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
128 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
129 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Hopkins ultimately was denied partnership,130 she sued for gender discrimination under Title 
VII.131 
 
In finding Price Waterhouse liable for violating Title VII in this case, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that, while employers retain broad latitude in making their employment decisions, 
such decisions cannot be made on the basis of gender.132  In cases where gender seems to play 
some role in a decision – perhaps in conjunction with other characteristics, unrelated to gender – 
an employer must be able to show that gender was not a motivating factor (i.e., that it would 
have made the same decision anyway, even if it had not taken gender into account).133  More 
importantly, the Court held that employers who make employment decisions on the basis of sex-
based stereotypes inherently are engaging in gender discrimination.134  The Court stated that 
“[w]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by insisting that they 
matched the stereotype associated with their group…,”135 noting that “an employer who acts on 
the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the 
basis of gender.”136  In other words, by basing its decisions regarding Hopkins’ potential 
partnership on assumptions about how a woman should behave at work – and by denying 
Hopkins partnership for not complying with these assumptions – Price Waterhouse had engaged 
in gender discrimination.137 
 
This theory of “sex stereotyping” gender discrimination has direct application to cases 
like Nelson, and could provide a possible route to success for other plaintiffs who claim to have 
received adverse treatment due to their attractive appearance.138  Just as Hopkins claimed to have 
suffered adverse treatment for not matching her colleagues’ expectations of a woman 
(essentially, for not being “feminine enough”),139 Nelson could have argued that she suffered 
from a similar failure to meet expectations as to how a female should look and behave, in that 
she claimed that she was too sexy and feminine for her workplace – at least according to her 
employer.140  From the way that she dressed to her willingness to tolerate (or perhaps engage in) 
130 See id. at 231-32 (noting that Hopkins initially was neither accepted nor denied partnership, but rather had her 
candidacy held for reconsideration the following year, and that partners in her office later refused to repropose her 
for partnership).   
131 See id. at 232. 
132 See id. at 239-40 (citations omitted). 
133 See id. at 239-42 (citations omitted);  see also id. at 242 (“We conclude that the preservation of [employer’s] 
freedom means that an employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, 
it would have come to the same decision regarding a particular person”). 
134 See id. at 251; cf. Allegra C. Wiles, More Than Just a Pretty Face:  Preventing the Perpetuation of Sexual 
Stereotypes in the Workplace, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 657,  660 (2007) (noting that “[s]ex stereotyping involves 
generalizing from the characteristics of a group to those of an individual and making assumptions, which may or 
may not be true, about an individual because of that person’s gender”) (citation omitted). 
135 Price Waterhouse, supra note 121, at 251 (citation omitted). 
136 Id. at 250. 
137 See id. at 256-57 (citations omitted). 
138 Others have discussed using a “gender stereotyping” theory of gender discrimination to address “appearance 
discrimination.”  See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 11; Wiles, supra note 134.  
139 Price Waterhouse, supra note 121 at 236-37 (quoting the district court judge’s view that “some of the partners’ 
remarks about Hopkins stemmed from an impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women….”) 
140 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 65-66. 
sexual discussions with Dr. Knight, Nelson could argue that she fell outside of the expected 
norm for a woman at work.141  
 
Tellingly, even the Iowa Supreme Court seemed to recognize the potential for this type of 
claim in Nelson.  The court explicitly discussed the gender stereotyping framework established 
by Price Waterhouse, stating that “[i]f Nelson could show that she had been terminated because 
she did not conform to a particular stereotype, this might be a different case.”142  While Nelson 
failed to provide evidence to support this theory,143 others who claim to have suffered adverse 
action due to their attractive physical appearance might be able to gather sufficient evidence to 
show that by violating gender norms regarding how female employees should dress and act at 
work, they ventured outside of the “cabined view of the proper behavior for women” that their 
employers imposed in the workplace.144  
 
Moreover, even under the theory that Nelson was terminated not for her appearance, but 
rather due to the jealousy-inducing relationship that she had with her boss, Nelson still perhaps 
could have supported a stereotyping theory of gender discrimination. Perhaps the “norm” that 
Nelson failed to satisfy here was not simply a failure to dress in the manner in which the Knights 
believed a working woman should dress, or appear in the manner in which the Knights believed 
a working woman should appear; perhaps the norm at issue involved Nelson’s behavior – her 
failure to behave in the manner in which Mrs. Knight thought a working woman should behave.  
To the extent that one might not expect a married woman to form a close, personal relationship 
with a male coworker or boss,145 the jealousy-inducing “relationship” that the formed the basis 
for Nelson’s termination could be seen as its own violation of gender expectations.  Although the 
court largely ignored this theory in its opinion, there is at least some evidence to support this 
analysis:  The court noted that Mrs. Knight had deemed it “strange that after being at work all 
day and away from her kids and husband that [Nelson] would not be anxious to get home like the 
other [women] in the office.”146  While the court acknowledged that “[v]iewed in isolation, this 
statement could be an example of a gender-based stereotype,”147 it gave this argument only 
cursory attention, quickly concluding that, in the broader context of other statements made by 
141 See id. 
142 See id. at 71. 
143 See id. 
144 Price Waterhouse, supra note 121, at 237; cf. Kimmel, supra note 11 (noting that “[d]iscrimination based on 
beauty is rooted in the same sexist principle as discrimination against the ugly.  Both rest of the power of the male 
gaze – the fact that men’s estimation of beauty is the defining feature of the category”). 
145 See, e.g., Kristi Gustafson Barlette, Can men and women be friends (at work)?, TIMESUNION.COM, Sept. 4, 2012, 
available at http://blog.timesunion.com/ontheedge/can-men-and-women-be-friends-at-work/50781/; Bethany 
Ramos, Your Work Husband is Ruining Your Marriage, www.mommyish.com, March 17, 2014, available at 
http://www.mommyish.com/2014/03/17/work-husband/; Leslie Rasmussen, Can Married Women Have Straight 
Male Friends?, www.rolereboot.org, Jan. 24, 2013, available at http://www.rolereboot.org/sex-and-
relationships/details/2013-01-can-married-women-have-single-male-friends; cf. Jana Kasperkevic, Why women 
can’t have business dinners with men, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 18, 2013, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/money/us-money-blog/2013/dec/18/women-business-dinners-men. 
146 Nelson, supra note 2, at 66 (parentheticals in original) (emphasis added); see also id. at 71, n.5. 
147 Nelson, supra note 2, at 71 n.5. 
Mrs. Knight, this statement instead simply evidenced Mrs. Knight’s (non-stereotype-based) 
concerns about Nelson’s relationship with Dr. Knight.148   
 
 While Nelson did not succeed in providing support for this type of gender stereotyping 
sex discrimination claim, other plaintiffs alleging adverse treatment due to their attractive 
physical appearance might have more success with this theory.  Indeed, even a cursory 
examination of the facts in other situations where employees have alleged adverse treatment due 
to their beauty indicates that this theory might play out differently in other cases:  In the 
Willingham case, for example – where the plaintiff was terminated after she appeared as “Ms. 
Cruzin’ South August 2008,” as well as in sexually suggestive photos in another publication)149 
– Ms. Willingham specifically alleged that “her physical appearance in a non-work related 
magazine did not comport with [the employer’s] preferred feminine stereotype which… required 
her to dress or appear ‘conservatively’ at all times.”150  The court, however, rejected this 
argument, finding that the out-of-work nature of the conduct here rendered a Price Waterhouse 
argument inapplicable here.151  Concerns about gender stereotypes likewise could be seen 
underlying the claims of Debrahlee Lorenzana, the Citibank banker who claimed to have been 
fired because her figure and clothes were “too distracting” to her male colleagues.152  
Presumably, had Lorenzana fit the mold of the typical banker – conservative, expensively but 
modestly attired153 – her male colleagues would not have noticed and/or been distracted by her 
appearance.154 
 
Notably, to bring this type of sex stereotyping claim, a plaintiff need not demonstrate that 
the defendant harbored hostility toward the protected group.155  In other words, neither Nelson 
nor any other plaintiff would have to show that their employer demonstrated ill will toward 
women in general.156  Rather, these employees only would have to show that men and women 
148 See id.; see also id. at 76 n.11 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (stating that “[a]s to the discriminatory stereotype that 
attractive to men who work closely with married men are a threat to a man’s marriage…, a threat derived from an 
actual, ongoing, personal relationship is not a stereotype”). 
149 See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.  
150 Willingham, supra note 76, at *3 (citation and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added) (ellipses in 
original). 
151 See id. at *4 (stating that Willingham’s sex stereotyping claim “fails because [she] has failed to allege that [she] 
did not conform to traditional gender stereotypes in any observable way at work”) (citation omitted) (emphasis and 
parentheticals in original). 
152 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
153 See Stereotypes of Traders and Banks, www.wallstreetoasis.com, June 2, 2011, available at  
http://www.wallstreetoasis.com/forums/stereotypes-of-traders-and-bankers (citing Yale finance professor Robert 
Shiller’s observation that “investment bankers tend to be well dressed; they tend to be patrician in their appearances 
and manner” 
154 In some circumstances, other types of stereotypes beyond those associated with gender (such as religious 
stereotypes) also arguably might play a role in adverse action. See, e.g., Francescani, supra note 89 (quoting female 
data entry employee fired from position at lingerie warehouse owned by Orthodox Jews as stating “I understand that 
there are Orthodox Jewish men who may have their views about how woman should dress…but I do not feel that any 
employer has the right to impose their religious beliefs on me”) (emphasis added).   
155 See Wiles, supra note 134, at 670.(citation omitted). 
156 In this respect, the court’s observations that Dr. Knight employed many women in his practice, and that all of his 
dental hygienists (including the one who ultimately replaced Nelson) had been women, see Nelson, supra note 2 at 
66, might have limited relevance.  While Knight may have harbored positive feelings toward women in general, this 
would not excuse his decision to take action against this woman, Nelson, based on a stereotype regarding how 
females should behave in the workplace. 
intentionally were treated differently in the workplace, even when the stereotypes underlying this 
treatment were benign.157 
 
At the same time, however, these cases involving gender stereotyping expose the “double 
bind” that many women face in the workplace.158  They must be “feminine enough” to satisfy 
their employers’ expectations regarding how a woman should appear and behave at work,159 but 
not so overtly sexual and overly feminine so as to distract their fellow employees.160  For 
Hopkins, this created an obvious catch 22:  She needed to be aggressive and forceful to excel in 
her job, but was denied the pinnacle of recognition for workplace success (i.e., partnership) 
precisely because she exhibited these traits.161   
 
Admittedly, for other female employees, this argument plays out somewhat differently 
than it would have in Hopkins.  Unlike Hopkins – who was required to be assertive in order to 
make partner, then penalized for meeting this expectation – the female plaintiffs in cases like 
Nelson, Willingham, or Lorenzana are not being asked to mute characteristics that are essential to 
performing or excelling in their job duties.  These women did not hold positions (dental assistant, 
banks) in which the attribute for which they purportedly were penalized – their physical 
attractiveness – enhanced their performance in any obvious way.  Yet despite this distinction, 
even plaintiffs in these “too hot” cases may be able to draw upon the underlying tenets of Price 
Waterhouse to argue that they suffered gender discrimination due to the application of sex 
stereotypes. 
 
III. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN MISREPRESENTING THESE CASES:  THE 
QUEST TO MAINTAIN THE “MADONNA-WHORE” PARADIGM 
 
Despite the possible routes to success may have existed for Nelson – from her neglected 
sexual harassment claim to a possible “gender stereotyping” claim – Nelson ultimately failed to 
prevail in her claim against Knight.162  Given the salacious facts in this case,163 some amount of 
media attention (and, perhaps, some critiquing of the result) was to be expected.  In the wake of 
the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision, however, the media unleashed an onslaught of 
condemnation toward this decision, eviscerating the court’s conclusion in this case.  From small, 
local outlets to national news organizations, the media almost uniformly described this case in 
simple (and often inaccurate) terms – as one involving a woman who had been fired solely based 
upon her appearance, and involving an all-male court with no concept of women’s rights, 
without addressing the complicated relational circumstances that underlay this case or the 
precedent that actually controlled the court’s decision.  
 
157 See Wiles, supra note 134, at 670 (citation omitted).  
158 Kimberly A. Yurako, Soul of a Woman, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 757, 762 (2012) (citation omitted). 
159 See id. (citation omitted); see also Price Waterhouse, supra note 121, at 251; cf. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating 
Comp., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104 (2006) (affirming summary judgment for employer where employee alleged gender 
discrimination after termination from bartender position for refusing to wear cosmetics and style hair in accordance 
with employer’s dress code). 
160 See Yurako, supra note 158, at 762 (citation omitted); see also Price Waterhouse, supra note 121, at 251. 
161 See Yurako, supra note 158, at 262-63 (citation omitted); see also Price Waterhouse, supra note 121, at 251. 
162 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 65. 
163 See supra notes 22-32 and associated text. 
A. Snapshot of a Hyperbolic Media 
 
The reporting in the wake of the Nelson decision – both following the initial, December 
2012 decision and the subsequent July 2013 decision – abounded with examples of the media 
presenting this decision in simplistic, hyperbolic and often flatly incorrect terms. Shortly 
following the court’s initial decision in this case, Business Insider headlined its coverage, 
“‘Irresistible’ Iowa Woman Fired for Being Too Sexy,”164 reporting that “[a]n ‘irresistible’ Iowa 
dental assistant fired for threatening her boss’s marriage – even though she turned away his 
advances – has lost her discrimination lawsuit.”165  (This, even though nothing in the record 
indicates that Nelson ever “turned away” Knight’s advances, and even though Nelson’s failure to 
bring a harassment claim seems to contradict such a characterization of her stance toward her 
boss.166)   
 
A CNN story following the court’s second decision described this case as one in which a 
woman was “[f]ired because a man can’t control himself,”167 blasting the “all-male Iowa 
Supreme Court” for allegedly holding “that men are so controlled by their gonads that they can 
fire an employee at will for being able to incite attraction, sex, love, whatever,”168 and for 
finding that “[n]o matter that she is going about her job or being a stellar employee; if she’s got a 
cute butt or a nicely turned nose, her job is history.”169  According to the CNN commentator, 
“the Iowa Supreme Court guys… saw the issue, at least in part, as protecting the institution of 
marriage rather than an infringement on a woman’s right to work.”170  Nowhere did this story 
mention that the Iowa court was relying upon precedent, which previously had held that an 
employer does not engage in gender discrimination by discharging a female employee who is 
involved in a consensual personal relationship that has triggered personal jealousy.171  Nowhere 
did the story mention the extent to which the Iowa court’s decision rested on the consensual 
nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson.172  Nowhere did this reporter explain the 
limited nature of the court’s decision – the fact that the court repeatedly had noted Nelson’s 
failure to bring a sexual harassment claim or otherwise to characterize Knight’s conduct as 
“unwelcome.”173 
 
And then, there was the New York Times editorial that seemed to set the bar for 
sensationalizing the Iowa court’s decision.  In a piece entitled Fired for Being Beautiful, the 
writer joined the media chorus in slamming the Iowa court’s decision.174  The author compared 
the Iowa Justices to Islamic fundamentalists, observing, “[y]es, like some Midwestern Taliban 
tribunal, the Iowa Supreme Court permitted a male boss to fire anyone who might conceivably 
164 ‘Irresistible’ Iowa Woman Fired For Being Too Sexy, supra note _. 
165 Id. 
166 See supra notes 64-65 and associated text. 
167 Schwartz, supra note 95. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 See Nelson. supra note 2, at 67. 
172 See supra notes 66-69 (collecting citations regarding the court’s repeated references to the consensual nature of 
Knight and Nelson’s relationship). 
173 See supra notes 64-65 (collecting citations regarding the court’s repeated references to Nelson’s failure to bring 
allege sexual harassment). 
174 See Kimmel, supra note 11. 
tempt him.  Mullah Omar would approve.”175  The writer went on to suggest that “[m]aybe… the 
Iowa Supreme Court should require all beautiful women to wear burquas,” opining that “[w]ith 
Ms. Nelson completely covered, Mr. Knight could pay full attention to his patients’ dental 
concerns – while ignoring the ethical cavity that mars discrimination law in Iowa.”176  Once 
again, nowhere in the article did the author mention the unusual factual circumstances under 
which this case arose.  Nowhere in his evisceration of Dr. Knight – with “his willpower so limp, 
his commitment to his wife so weak, that he must be shielded from the hot and the beautiful”177 
– did the writer note the apparently consensual nature of the relationship between Knight and 
Nelson, nor the significant role that this relationship played in leading the court to its decision. 
 
Local outlets likewise played a role in simplifying and hyperbolizing the results in this 
case, particularly in editorials and other opinion pieces.  In the wake of the Iowa Supreme 
Court’s initial decision, one local editorial identified Knight’s attraction to Nelson and fear that 
he might act unprofessionally toward her “the lone reason” for Nelson’s termination.178  While 
the editorial mentioned prior precedent that “upheld an employer’s right to fire for relationships 
that cause jealousy and tension within a business owner’s family,”179 the editorial again failed to 
note the limited nature of the court’s decision, with its emphasis on the consensual nature of the 
relationship between Knight and Nelson.180  Another editorial more explicitly argued both sides 
of the issue:  While the piece acknowledged that finding in Nelson’s favor would “force[] an 
employer in [Knight’s] situation to keep an employee whose continued employment could lead 
to a sexual-harassment lawsuit, a divorce or both,”181 its headline trumpeted that “Iowa law 
allows men to be jerks.”182  Yet another editorial instructed its readers, “[t]hat’s right ladies.  If 
the boss finds you too hot, you can be fired,”183 neglecting to inform readers of the full, more 
nuanced scope of the court’s decision – that if your boss “finds you too hot,” and you engage in a 
consensual relationship with him that causes jealousy, and you fail ever to allege that his 
comments about your “hotness” were unwelcome or harassing… you can be fired.  This local 
criticism continued in the wake of the court’s second opinion in this case.  A piece tellingly titled 
“… Court backs lusty boss over the innocent employee” described this case in similarly 
simplistic terms, electing simply to blast the court’s “adolescent rationale” and “idiotic 
conclusion” instead of explaining the nuances of this decision to its readers.184  
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
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178 Firing just for being ‘too hot’ is discrimination, supra note 65 (emphasis added) 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 The Register editorial:  Unfortunately, Iowa law allows men to be jerks, DES MOINES REGISTER, Dec. 28, 2012 
182 Id. 
183 Another View:  Iowa court shows that equality between the sexes really isn’t, DES MOINES REGISTER, Jan. 2, 
2013. 
184 What Others Are Saying:  Court backs lusty boss over the innocent employee, DES MOINES REGISTER, July 18 
2013.  Notably, at least one Iowa paper reported this decision in what appeared to be a fair, accurate and non-
sensationalized manner (despite a headline foreshadowing to the contrary).  In Top Iowa court’s do-over: 
‘Irresistible employee’ fired legally for personal reasons, the Des Moines Register accurately noted that in the Iowa 
Supreme Court’s first decision in this case, it had “cit[ed] prior legal precedent” to rule that “Knight’s conduct was 
legal because it was based on specific emotions tied to a specific relationship and not based on his attitude toward an 
entire gender.”  Top Iowa court’s do-over: ‘Irresistible employee’ fired legally for personal reasons, DES MOINES 
REGISTER, July 13, 2013.  Describing the court’s follow-up decision on reconsideration, the article reported that 
“Nelson was terminated because of the activities of her consensual personal relationship with her employer, not 
 
To be sure, in all of these cases, there was a sizable kernel of truth in the media’s 
reporting:  To the extent that the stories portrayed this case as one where an employer was 
permitted to terminate Ms. Nelson because her physical attractiveness led to a consensual 
relationship with her employer, and such relationship rendered her a threat to her employer’s 
marriage (at least, in her employer’s wife’s view), these reporters correctly portrayed at least part 
of the story.  But virtually none of the stories reporting this decision provided the proper context 
for this case – explaining the Iowa precedent that exempts from discrimination liability 
terminations resulting from consensual personal relationships that cause jealously, or noting the 
extent to which the outcome here rested upon a very narrow set of facts, in which the terminated 
employee specifically declined to allege that her employer’s conduct and comments were 
unwelcome or harassing.  While it may have made for better news to portray the justices of the 
Iowa Supreme Court as a rogue group of misogynistic bigots, a more accurate report regarding 
this case would have included these less sensationalistic – but legally significant – facts. 
 
Interestingly, even the Iowa Supreme Court itself may have sensed the potential for the 
media and the public to misunderstand the nature of this case.  As noted above,185 the Iowa 
Supreme Court issued two decisions in this case – first issuing a unanimous opinion granting 
summary judgment to Dr. Knight on December 21, 2012,186 and later substituting a second 
opinion in July 2013 (and doing so without having any new evidence presented to the court and 
without any additional oral argument).187  While this second opinion again affirmed summary 
judgment for Dr. Knight,188 it differed from the court’s initial opinion in some significant 
respects.  First, while all of the Justices had signed onto the court’s December 2012 opinion,189 
this July opinion included a lengthy Concurrence authored by the Chief Justice of the court.190  
This Concurring opinion contained a more extensive explanation of the “basis and rationale” for 
the court’s decision than that which had been issued previously.191  Among other points, the 
Chief Justice emphasized that Nelson had stated a claim for sex discrimination (or, perhaps, 
several possible claims for sex discrimination) under Iowa law,192 arguing that she simply had 
failed to articulate sufficient facts to support her claim,193 particularly in light of the consensual 
nature of her relationship with Dr. Knight.194  Withdrawing a unanimous opinion only to 
substitute another that reaches the same result (simply with somewhat more extensive analysis), 
likely is not a common action for an already overburdened court.  Indeed, issuing such an 
because of her gender,” id., and cited the Justices’ view that “Nelson was fired because of her behavior, not her 
gender.” Id. To be sure, the greater depth of analysis, thoroughness, and balanced nature of this article as compared 
to others cited herein might be due to the fact that it was a news article, and not an editorial or opinion piece.   
Nonetheless, the contrast between this article and others appearing in reputable media outlets is notable. 
185 See supra note 44. 
186 See Nelson withdrawn opinion, supra note 2. 
187 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 64 n.1; see also Top Iowa court’s do over…, supra note 108 (characterizing the 
justices decision to reconsider the case without any new evidence bring presented as a “rare move”). 
188 See id. at 73. 
189 See Nelson withdrawn opinion, supra note 2. 
190 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 73. 
191 See id. (Cady, C.J., concurring). 
192 See id. at 76-77 (Cady, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 76 n.1 (Cady, C.J., concurring).; id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., 
concurring). 
193 See id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring) 
194 See id. at 78. 
opinion without seeking additional briefing from the parties or additional oral argument seems 
even more unusual.195  Perhaps, faced with such tremendous – and possibly unexpected – media 
backlash in the wake of the court’s initial decision, the Justices felt compelled to clarify their 
reasoning.196 
 
The court’s second opinion also framed the key question faced by the court in a manner 
that differed from the first opinion in a significant way:  In its initial, December 2012 opinion, 
the court framed the question that it faced as “whether an employee who has not engaged in 
flirtatious conduct may be lawfully terminated simply because the boss views the employee as an 
irresistible attraction.”197  In its July 2013 opinion, the court framed the question somewhat 
differently, asking “whether an employee who has not engaged in flirtatious conduct may be 
lawfully terminated simply because the boss’s spouse views the relationship between the boss 
and the employee as a threat to her marriage.”198  In this way, the court shifted its focus from 
looking at Knight’s conduct – his potential inability to resist a sexual relationship with Nelson – 
to a focus on the relationship between Knight and Nelson. The former framing of the question 
opens the door to the type of subjective analysis and gender warfare characterizations that 
emerged in many of the media stories regarding this case, making it easy for reporters and other 
commentators to blast Dr. Knight for his uncontrollable lust and weak will-power.199  Indeed, 
many of the articles that came out in the wake of this initial decision seized on the “irresistible” 
language in the opinion as a way of framing this case.200  How does one find a legal or factual 
basis for determining whether an employee is sufficiently “irresistible” to justify her termination 
(assuming that such “irresistible-ness” ever can serve as a justification for termination)?  In 
contrast, by framing the question before the court in terms of the consensual relationship 
between Nelson and Dr. Knight, the court not only could provide a stronger factual basis for its 
decision given the wealth of evidence regarding this relationship,201 but also could tie its 
decision to relevant precedent – precedent that previously had held that terminations related to 
consensual relationships which cause jealousy do not violate Title VII.202  This revised framing 
195 See JonathanTurley.org (Blog), supra note 2. 
196 See Ruling no better after further explanation, IOWA CITY PRESS-Citizen, JULY 23, 2013 (questioning whether 
Chief Justice Cady’s motivation for drafting special concurrence in second opinion was related to the extensive 
criticism that the initial decision had received, including from various late-night comedians); see also Top Iowa 
court’s do-over…, supra note 108 (citing speculation that “some of the justices were concerned that the public 
misunderstood that original decision… So they clarified it”); What Others Are Saying:  Court backs the lusty boss 
over the innocent employee, DES MOINES REGISTER, July 18, 2013 (noting that the court had agreed to reconsider 
“its much-mocked ruling”). 
197 See Nelson withdrawn opinion, supra note 2, at *5 (emphasis added). 
198 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 69 (emphasis added) 
199 See, e.g., The Register editorial:  Unfortunately, Iowa law allows men to be jerks, supra note 181  (asserting that 
“Nelson suffered because Knight couldn’t control his libido”); Firing just for being “too hot” is discrimination, 
supra note 65 (arguing that Knight finding Nelson sexually attractive and worrying that he might act 
unprofessionally toward her was the lone reason for Nelson’s termination). 
200 See, e.g., ‘Irresistible’ Iowa Woman Fired For Being Too Sexy, supra note 108; Fired because a man can’t 
control himself, supra note 176; Fired just for being ‘too hot’ is discrimination, supra note 65; Top Iowa court’s do-
over: ‘Irresistible employee’ fired legally for personal reasons, supra note 108; JonathanTurley.org (Blog), supra 
note 2 (titling blog post “The Irresistible Woman Meets The Incorrigible Court:  Iowa Supreme Court Issues New 
Opinion Upholding Firing In ‘Irresistible Attraction’ Case”). 
201 See supra notes 66-69 and associated text. 
202 See id. 
of the question thus may have allowed the court to provide a stronger legal and factual basis for 
its decision – and perhaps one that would seem more palatable to the public.203 
 
B. Sexiness Sells:  The Media’s Sensationalism Bias 
So given the legal and factual basis for the ultimate result in this case, why did many in 
the media still get the Nelson case so wrong, even after the court issued its second decision?  
What led the media to ignore the complicated and nuanced background to this case and instead 
report this dispute as one simply involving a woman allegedly fired for being “too hot” for her 
employer?  The answer lies in more fundamental flaws in the media’s method of reporting issues 
– and particularly in reporting on legal issues. 
 
While inaccurate or otherwise skewed reporting by the media inevitably provides some 
cause for concern, the notion that the media gets things wrong likely is not shocking to the 
average observer of the news.  Indeed, the media seems to make errors all the time – 
oversimplifying complex issues, exaggerating events, and sensationalizing stories at every 
opportunity.204  As one commentator observed, the “[m]ass media will oversimplify and dumb 
down discussions of public issues, substitute sensationalism and amusement for deliberation 
about public questions, and transform news and politics into forms of entertainment and 
spectacle.”205  Far from the ideal of serious reporting on important issues, the media has evolved 
into an amalgamation of “newszak, bonk journalism, infotainment, or simply tabloid news.”206 
 
Yet while it may be accepted wisdom that the media generally prioritizes entertainment 
over information, this misplacement of reporting priorities seems particularly problematic in the 
context of legal reporting – in stories focusing on the criminal or civil liability or individuals or 
corporations. In an empirical project that surveyed the views of general counsels working at S & 
P 500 companies, law firm partners, and public relations executives, the media’s failure 
accurately to report on legal issues represented one significant concern (among many others) of 
those responding, as many lawyer interviewees complained that the media “tends to oversimplify 
complex issues and get the facts and details wrong.”207  As one participant noted, “[the media] 
want for me to get down to the sound bite, and I wanna push back and say, “It’s not a sound 
bite.”208  
 
203 At least one major media outlet – the New York Times – picked up on and accurately reported about this change 
in the framing of the question before the court.  See Iowa:  Court Reaffirms Dentist’s Firing of Woman He Found 
Too Attractive, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 12, 2013 (reporting that the court’s second opinion had eliminated 
references to Knight’s alleged “irresistible attraction” to Nelson, instead asking whether Nelson was fired “because 
of the activities of her consensual personal relationship”). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court itself has decried the extent to which the media misrepresents 
and distorts outcomes in matters of law.  For example, shortly after Justice Alito joined the 
Court, he noted in a speech that “the news media typically oversimplifies and sensationalizes.”209  
Justice Ginsburg has expressed similar concerns, arguing that the press often overinterprets 
unimportant actions, inappropriately forecasts outcomes, and overstates the significance of 
certiorari denials.210  The headlines chosen by the press, according to Ginsburg, are “more eye-
catching than significant.”211  Equally vociferous in his criticism of the media, Justice Scalia has 
observed that “[t]he press is never going to report judicial opinions accurately… They’re just 
going to report, who is the plaintiff?  Was that a nice old lady?  And who is the defendant?  Was 
this, you know, some skuzzy guy?  And who won?  Was it the good guy that won or the bad 
guy?”212  Such complaints about the media may seem mundane – even when lobbed by the 
highest judicial officers in the land.  But why is the public so complacent about a media that 
exaggerates, spins, flattens and misleads?  Particularly when the media reports on stories of legal 
significance, perhaps this failure to “get it right” should be greater cause for alarm. 
 
C. Bias on Steroids:  The Need for a Script in Stories Involving Women 
 
While the media’s tendency simultaneously to hyperbolize and oversimplify legal stories 
hardly comes as a surprise, this inability to present the news in an accurate and unbiased manner 
is even more pronounced in stories involving female protagonists.  News stories about women 
invariably focus in their physical appearance to a far greater degree than stories about their male 
counterparts.213  According to one scholar, “many newspaper editors seem incapable of printing 
a story featuring a woman without some evaluation of her attractiveness, or at least a description 
of her age and her hair colour.”214  Men, in contrast, rarely are described in terms of their 
physical appearance – and on those rare occasions when a man’s appearance does make its way 
into a news story, it generally is reported in a more objective, “meta-level” manner (such as by 
discussing the phenomenon of a male star’s sex symbol status, as opposed to the star’s physical 
appearance itself).215 
 
More disturbing is the manner in which female appearance makes its way into these 
stories:  Regardless of her identity or status, a woman in the news tends to be represented “in one 
of two ways – in terms of her domestic role or her sexual attractiveness.”216  In this vein, women 
who fail to confirm to the media’s physical expectations find themselves subject to vilification 
209John Heilprin, Scalia Sees Shift in Court’s Role, WashingtonPost.com, Oct. 23, 2006, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/22/AR2006102200965.html. 
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212 See Heilprin, supra note 209.  Justice Thomas has been even more direct in his vilification of the media, 
publically referring to members of the media as “smart-aleck commentators,” “snot-nosed brat[s],” “talking heads 
who shout at each other,” and “snotty nosed smirks.”  Justice Thomas Complains nation ‘Awash In Cynicism,’ 
ChicagoTrubune.com, Sept. 15, 1998, available at, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-09-
15/news/9809150138_1_fight-cynicism-white-house-intern-monica-lewinsky.  
213 See Gill, supra note 206, at 115-16. 
214 Id. at 115. 
215 See id. at 116. 
216 Id. at 115. 
and scorn.217  From the media’s reporting on President Clinton’s relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky (“a chorus of ‘ugh – how could he,’ rather than any political or ethical debate about 
[the President’s behavior]”),218 to the British press’s vicious attacking of Duchess Sarah 
Ferguson’s (“Fergie’s”) appearance (with a telephone poll inviting male participants to rate 
whether they would rather “date … Fergie or a goat”),219 to attacks on actress Kate Winslet 
following her appearance in the movie Titanic (printing diet plans for her follow and dubbing her 
“Titanic Kate,” instead of focusing on the merits of her Oscar nominated performance),220 this 
focus on female physical appearance over substance seems to apply across subject matters. 
 
Surprisingly, even well established women whose place in the public eye seemingly has 
no link to their appearance find themselves judged by these same beauty standards.  A study of 
female parliamentarians in Britain, South Africa and Australia revealed numerous examples of a 
media fixated on the appearance of these female politicians,221 with at least one respondent 
commenting that “[w]omen are never the right age. We are too young, we’re too old.  We are too 
thin, we’re too fat.  We wear too much makeup, we don’t wear enough.  We are too flashy in our 
dress, we don’t take enough care.  There isn’t a thing we can do that is right.”222  Closer to home, 
former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton received similar, appearance-focused coverage both 
during and after her run for the White House.  On the presidential campaign trail, Clinton’s 
appearance “was a common topic of conversation” in coverage of her campaign,223 with 
observers commenting on everything from the color of her suit to her latest hairstyle.224  Even 
one of Clinton’s male rivals on the campaign trial, former Senator Fred Thompson, noted the 
different standard to which Clinton was held, sympathizing that “Clinton has to look matronly 
without looking beautiful, tough without looking harsh.”225  During her tenure as Secretary of 
State, Clinton’s decision to appear wearing glasses (as opposed to contact lenses) and with no 
cosmetics other than lipstick drew national attention, along with a front-and-center place on the 
well-known Drudge Report.226  While some in the media expressed outrage that Clinton’s 
appearance without makeup might qualify as “news,” others defended Clinton’s appearance in 
these same gendered terms – arguing that she looked “fresh-faced” in the pictures, that she 
looked “good” in the photos.227  Rather than focus on the content of the visit during which these 
photos were taken – a diplomatic stop in Bangladesh – these stories continued a pattern of 
characterizing a woman in the news according to her appearance. 
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Despite working in a profession in which physical appearance seems to lack any 
relevance, even women in the military find themselves confronted by a “beauty bias” – albeit, 
perhaps in a manner somewhat different from that faced by other women in the news.  One 
female solder recently found herself receiving the brunt of a female superior’s ire after her photo 
appeared in a military publication showing her “wearing carefully applied eyeliner and lip 
gloss.”228  According to the superior officer, the photo “undermine[d] the rest of the message 
[about gender parity in combat] (and may even make people ask if breaking a nail is considered 
hazardous duty).”229  In this officer’s view – and contrary to the conventional wisdom (in which 
those who satisfy societal standards of physical beauty find themselves with many advantages as 
compared to other “less attractive” peers)230 – “ugly women are perceived as competent while 
pretty women are perceived as having used their looks to get ahead.”231  Thus, to a great degree, 
the women portrayed in these stories find themselves in a no-win situation:  Women who are not 
sufficiently physically attractive face an onslaught of criticism and belittlement,232 but those who 
seem “too beautiful” may find themselves stereotyped and written off in other ways.233  In the 
words of one commentator, “[y]ou have to be beautiful to matter, but beauty can and will be used 
against you.”234   
 
These no-win restrictions that women face with respect to their appearance actually 
extend much further than skin deep.  In creating a dichotomy for portraying women in the news, 
the media not only seems focused on their subjects’ physical beauty, but also often amplifies 
appearance into behavior:  Women not only must fit into a particular “box” with respect to the 
way that they look, but also must fall into a predetermined role related to their sexuality (or lack 
thereof). Here too, women fall into one of two roles – either that of the Madonna (pure and 
pristine with sexuality muted), or that of the whore (sexually promiscuous and often vilified).235  
From popular music,236 to literature,237 to movies,238 to children’s animated films,239 women are 
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portrayed as either virtuous and pure or as desire-driven and cunning, with virtually no room for 
any grey area in between. 
 
This crabbed view regarding how women are portrayed in public extends beyond 
fictional depictions in books, movies and the like.  Indeed, “real” women portrayed in the news 
may find themselves shoved into this same storyline.  Few events in recent media history 
illustrate the Madonna/Whore dichotomy faced by women in the news more than the late 1980’s 
sex scandal involving televangelist Jim Bakker and former church secretary Jessica Hahn.240  
 
In December 1980, renowned televangelist Jim Bakker, head of the Praise the Lord 
(PTL) Ministries, had a sexual encounter with former church secretary Jessica Hahn in a Florida 
hotel room.241  When news of their encounter became public in 1987, Bakker and Hahn each told 
different stories about what had happened during this encounter.  According to the initial version 
of the story (the version told both by Hahn and by the national press), Hahn had been a modest, 
20-year old woman who initially cleaned toilets at church, eventually became the church’s 
secretary, and who had exhibited total devotion to her job, including praying by phone with those 
in need.242  Despite her physical attractiveness, Hahn had been only been on a handful of 
dates.243  Her sex education had come from library books as opposed to life experience, and she 
had vowed to remain a virgin until marriage.244   
 
In the immediate wake of the scandal, when Hahn’s relationship with Bakker first 
became public, Hahn’s portrayal in the media epitomized the innocent Madonna:  She was 
depicted as the “ruined-innocent, good-girl character… weeping after a phone call to her 
parents… reading the Bible… demure and unprepossessing.”245  She claimed never to have 
wanted money from Bakker as a result of this encounter (despite eventually collecting a 
settlement of $265,000 from his church), but rather claimed only to have wanted an opportunity 
to vent her grievances and perhaps receive an apology from Bakker.246 
 
Hahn’s reprieve in the media limelight, however, proved to be short lived.  The media 
soon was reporting on the large financial settlement that Hahn had received, implying that “good 
girls, even if they do actually have sex, and even if they’re forced to, don’t get paid for it….”247 
The press mentioned her “shiny lipstick and Porsche sunglasses, her boots, tight jeans and tight 
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sweaters.”248  Eventually, after the million-dollar payout for her appearance in Playboy became 
public, the media and its consumers quickly abandoned any allegiance with or sympathy for 
Hahn.249  In the eyes of both the media and the public at large, Hahn became just another “loose 
woman,” a seductress, willing to sell her chastity to the highest bidder.250  Indeed, in the words 
of one observer, “it[] [was] as though Hahn reached behind her head and slowly peeled off the 
face of the virginal church secretary to reveal – gasp! – her evil, nymphomaniacal, come-and-
get-it twin.”251 
 
In many ways, Hahn’s transformation was typical.  Indeed, this need to force Hahn into a 
particular persona, victim or vamp, falls squarely within the media’s usual modus operandi.252  
As one commentator has observed, this dichotomy – this “axis of sexually ‘pure’ and sexually 
‘ruined,’ of virgin or whore, of loose woman or bad girl…” – remains “one of the central axes 
along which women’s positioning in the public sphere has run.”253  Hahn’s ability to straddle 
both stereotypes, to act as both “[g]ood girl and her evil twin, trusting, naïve ruined woman and 
calculating, sex-drenched golddigger, victim and vamp…,” casts her as what some have called 
“the best summary we have of the sex scandal icon.”254 
 
Yet while the media’s desire to characterize Hahn as fitting into one of two boxes might 
not come as a surprise given the media’s tendency to oversimplify and typecast, the speed and 
fierceness with which the media and the public turned on Hahn – rejecting her claims of 
innocence and virginity and chastising her as a loose woman and media whore – does raise 
questions.  Almost from the moment that Hahn’s encounter with Bakker became public, one 
sensed a media struggling with how to characterize her tale.  Even the earliest descriptions of 
Hahn “swing between the dog-loving, Bible-reading, small-town virgin and her alter-ego, the 
big-haired, gum-chomping, knowing tease.”255  From this perspective, it would not take much – 
merely the slightest push in one direction or the other, toward Madonna or whore – to vault Hahn 
more permanently into one of these two camps. 
 
Admittedly, Hahn made it easy for members of the media to describe her in hyperbolic 
terms.  She provided ample fodder for the press to cast as either the “[p]ower hungry temptress 
of powerful man (busty, licking her lips)…”256 or the “chaste beauty ruined by powerful man 
(young, smooth, eyes cast down but glancing up with hints of desire)”).257  But why did she have 
to be one or the other?  Wasn’t it possible that Hahn, like most women, was a woman with a 
complex personality and nuanced sexuality, and not simply a one-dimensional cartoon character?  
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In shoving Hahn consecutively into these two boxes, first that of virgin, then that of whore, the 
media oversimplified what likely was a much more complex tale. 
 
In this way, the media’s portrayal of Hahn can provide insight into the flawed coverage 
of Knight v. Nelson.  Perhaps, just as the media seemed so eager to cement Hahn into a particular 
mold, so too did they desire similarly to define Nelson – to characterize Nelson as either 
“Madonna” or “whore.”  Yet Nelson also did not fit cleanly into either of these categories.  As a 
(mostly) passive target of Dr. Knight’s amorous proclamations – the mere recipient of his 
explicit communications258 – Nelson hardly could be characterized as a whore.  Knight, and not 
Nelson, seemed both to initiate and foster their inappropriate relationship.259  At the same time, 
however, Nelson’s behavior seemed not quite virginal.  As the Iowa court noted repeatedly in its 
opinion, Nelson not only never objected to Knight’s overtures, she also apparently did not even 
deem them harassing in nature.260  Perhaps the court believed that a “true” virgin would have 
responded less passively to such graphic statements from a man other than her husband or 
partner.261 
 
Thus, faced with a protagonist who could not fit squarely into a predetermined role, the 
media found itself faced with a choice regarding how it wanted to characterize Nelson in this 
story – and it chose the Madonna persona.  Whether driven by an inherent sympathy for the 
underdog plaintiff,262 by a desire to tell a more sensational story,263 or by other forces altogether, 
the media by and large opted to portray this case as one in which a (largely) innocent employee 
“suffered because Knight couldn’t control his libido…”264  (Indeed, at least one editorial framed 
this case in precisely those terms, titling a piece “Court backs the lusty boss over the innocent 
employee.”)265  Yet by forcing Nelson into a cloak that didn’t quite fit, the media inevitably 
skewed its coverage of her story.  It couldn’t report on Nelson’s passivity in the face of Knight’s 
graphic overtures without tarnishing Nelson’s pure and pristine appearance.  It couldn’t describe 
the legal nuance in the Iowa court’s decision – the precedent permitting terminations based on 
relationships that create jealousy,266 or the court’s surprise at Nelson’s failure to allege sexual 
harassment,267 or the limited scope of the opinion itself268 – without weakening the power of the 
broader narrative.  Better to portray a simple tale of a female employee twice wronged – first by 
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her lust-ridden employer and then by an out-of-touch, misogynistic court – than to convey the 
true complexities that underlay this case. 
 
D. A Perfect Storm:  Media Sensationalism + Gender Stereotyping Leads to 
Skewed Reporting in Gender Discrimination Cases 
 
While the Nelson case provides one insight into how the media’s need to oversimplify 
and stereotype female protagonists leads to skewed reporting and misinformation, this case sadly 
represents but one example of a much broader trend.  In fact, the media’s need to place female 
protagonists in a particular box (either pure and pristine or sexually promiscuous), combined 
with the media’s general tendency to sensationalize and oversimplify, may lead to skewed 
reporting in a whole class of stories – those involving gender discrimination claims brought by 
female plaintiffs.   
 
In their 2004 study of print media accounts of employment discrimination cases from 
1990 to 2000, Laura Beth Nielson and Aaron Beim found that the print media depicts 
employment discrimination plaintiffs in a significantly more favorable light than reality 
warrants.269  These researchers found that the manner in which the media portrays outcomes in 
gender discrimination cases vastly misrepresents reality in a manner highly favorable to 
discrimination plaintiffs.270   Specifically, among other misrepresentations, these researchers 
found that the media depicts higher “win rates” and higher award amounts for plaintiffs in these 
suits than actually is the case in federal court outcomes.271 
 
Neilsen and Beim found that during the period relevant to their study, plaintiffs were 
portrayed in the media as having prevailed in 85% of all adjudicated cases (meaning that in those 
media stories that specified a winner, plaintiffs prevailed 85% of the time).272  The actual “win 
rate” for plaintiffs in district court during this period, however, was 32% – less than half of that 
reflected in media accounts.273  When the study focused specifically on media coverage of jury 
trials (a sample which itself is skewed with respect to outcomes, given the large number of cases 
that settle), the media reported plaintiff victories in 98% of the trials covered, as compared to an 
“actual” win rate of 41% for jury trial plaintiffs.274  Media reports of discrimination cases tried as 
bench trials similarly depicted prevailing plaintiffs in 68% of all reports of concluded cases, as 
compared to an actual win rate of 20% for discrimination plaintiffs who opt for a bench trial.275  
Neilsen and Beim also found that the media inflated the size of awards in employment 
discrimination cases during this period:  In stories regarding jury trials, the median jury award 
reported was $1,100,000.276  The actual median jury award in discrimination cases during this 
period was less than 7 times this amount – $150,000.277  
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As the authors of this study concluded, “[t]hese data demonstrate dramatic differences 
between media accounts of employment discrimination cases and the actual dynamics and 
outcomes of litigation.”278 The authors worried that “[b]y portraying employment discrimination 
lawsuits as those in which plaintiffs consistently and uniformly prevail, the media may be 
contributing to its readership’s formation of an expectation of an outcome that is rarely met.”279  
Admittedly, Neilsen and Beim’s focus was on discrimination cases generally, as opposed to 
solely on cases involving gender discrimination.280  Yet statistics indicate that gender 
discrimination claims consistently have made up a significant portion of all charges filed with the 
EEOC – comprising roughly one-third of all charges filed with the agency between 1992 and 
2013.281  While there admittedly is a difference between charges merely filed with the EEOC and 
cases that eventually their way into district court (i.e., the latter being the basis of Neilsen and 
Beim’s analysis), there is no reason to believe that gender discrimination charges settle or are 
otherwise resolved at any greater or lesser rate than other types of charges. Thus, one can assume 
that Neilsen and Beim’s findings regarding misrepresentations with respect to discrimination 
claims generally will be similarly reflected in any data regarding gender claims specifically.   
 
By carrying over this unrealistic expectation specifically into lawsuits involving gender 
discrimination – cases in which women most frequently serve as plaintiffs282 – the media not 
only may be skewing the public’s understanding of these types of claims, but also, as discussed 
below, altering expectations regarding the role of women in the workplace more generally.   
Indeed, by portraying the vast majority of female plaintiffs in these cases as “innocent victims” 
to an extent that belies reality, the media continues and exacerbates the stratification that women 
already face in the workplace and beyond:  “True” victims of gender discrimination must 
comport with the image of the Madonna, pure and pristine, while those women who happen to 
fall outside of this box may be treated more harshly and vilified.   
 
IV. HIGH STAKES ERRORS:  THE RAMIFICATIONS OF MEDIA BIAS IN 
STORIES INVOLVING WORKPLACE GENDER DISCRIMINATION 
 
As already noted, there is nothing shocking about the proposition that the media 
misrepresents, hyperbolizes, sensationalizes and oversimplifies.  While many may wish that the 
media would do a better job – particularly when reporting on legal matters – the fact that these 
general problems carry over into the legal context likely comes as no surprise to the average 
consumer of the news.  Indeed, the media’s very ability to skew the public’s understanding of 
278 Id. at 256. 
279 Id.at 243. 
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women in the workplace, particularly when it comes claims of gender discrimination, flows out 
of the fact that most lay individuals have quite limited knowledge of employment law.  For 
example, most individuals fail to appreciate the meaning of the “employment at will doctrine,” 
which permits an employer to terminate a worker’s employment at any time, for any reason.283  
Thus, when members of the public hear stories about employees being treated unfairly, many 
automatically assume that such conduct is illegal.284 
 
It is equally unsurprising to discover that the media often portrays female protagonists in 
a manner that favors stereotype and caricature over complexity and precision.  The 
“Madonna”/”whore” labels encompass roles that have long-been associated with women both 
inside and outside of the workplace.  Whether the subject is a celebrity, a political figure, or any 
ordinary citizen, the media defaults to descriptions grounded in a woman’s physical appearance 
and/or sexuality.285 
 
So why should anyone care when these two phenomenon occur simultaneously?  Why 
should it matter when the media not only glosses over details or otherwise skews the facts in 
legal stories involving female plaintiffs, but also when it does so by adhering to this 
Madonna/whore dichotomy?  These errors matter because of the broader impact they may have 
on women, both within the workplace and beyond.  By telling the “stories” about discrimination 
cases in a way that not only is inaccurate, but that also perpetuates stereotypes regarding the role 
of women, the media unwittingly may be altering how the broader public views women both in 
and out of work.  Moreover, this change in how the broader public understands the roles of 
women may have several significant ramifications. 
 
First, inaccuracies in the media regarding how women are portrayed (i.e., as Madonna or 
whore; as physically desirable or useless), may impact the public’s priorities with respect to 
policy and legislation.  The media has a direct impact on how lay individuals understand the 
law.286  As one legal scholar has observed, “[m]uch of what Americans know, or only think they 
know, about legal issues comes from media portrayals.”287  The media impacts which issues their 
audiences take seriously: By ignoring some problems and paying attention to others, the media 
helps to shape the legal and policy priorities of the general public.288  When the media 
consistently repeats certain stories and frameworks, individuals come to understand the law 
primarily through these frameworks – especially if the individuals are starting from a point of 
relative naïveté and thus are less capable of challenging what they see.289  Thus, if the story that 
media consumers see again and again is one where female plaintiffs almost always prevail in 
employment discrimination lawsuits, receiving enormous damage awards, and one in which 
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these female plaintiffs must fit into a particular template with respect tot heir appearance and 
sexuality, this may alter the lens through which employers, human resource professionals, 
employees, and even judges and other policy makers view the workplace.290  The workplace 
becomes an arena not where discrimination claims are rare, and where such claims are evaluated 
objectively according to the facts, but rather becomes akin to a battlefield, where employers must 
remain on guard against unfounded claims by scheming vixens (as well as perhaps some 
legitimate claims brought by truly victimized females) – both of which will cost the employer 
dearly.  An employer focused on maintaining this defensive crouch may prioritize guarding 
against discrimination liability in an unnecessarily high position, overlooking other important 
tasks key to running a successful business.291 
 
 In addition to impacting the priorities that are set with respect to the relative importance 
of “women’s issues,” these misrepresentations of women in the public eye also can have a 
concrete impact on policies and practices in the business world.  When the media paints a picture 
in which discrimination plaintiffs overwhelmingly prevail, and then characterizes the female 
plaintiffs who may initiate these cases as either innocent victims or conniving vamps, it fuels an 
excessive fear among employers regarding employment discrimination lawsuits.292  This 
excessive fear, in turn, may have a direct impact on personnel decisions – who to hire and who to 
fire.293  Indeed, research has shown that human resource professionals often overestimate – and 
thus overcompensate for – the risk of liability from employment-related litigation.294  In some 
cases, these perceived threats of liability might discourage employers from hiring women (or 
members of other protected groups) out of fear regarding their potential exposure if adverse 
action must be taken against such individuals down the road.295  In other words, employers may 
be less likely to hire women if they fear that a female employee who later is fired, or denied a 
raise, or misses out on a promotion is likely not only to sue for gender discrimination, but also to 
win (and to win a significant award).  In this way, the skewed image of women presented by the 
media may be having an impact on the composition of the workforce.296 
 
This increased fear of liability that many employers may have regarding having women 
in the workplace also may be creating a market for certain types of liability insurance.  
“Employment Practices Liability Insurance” (“EPLI”) provides employers with insurance against 
290 See id. at 260. 
291 See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment Discrimination 
Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 964, 985 (1999) (describing host of “litigation avoidance strategies” used 
by employers); see also Nancy Hatch Woodward, Discrimination Claims:  A growing concern for employers, 265 
EMPLOYMENT LAW COUNSELOR NL 3(Sept. 2012) (noting that “[m]ore people are filing discrimination claims at the 
same time that the … [EEOC] is using more aggressive investigative techniques to root out systemic discrimination 
in the workplace); Catherine Rampell, More Workers Complain of Bias on the Job, a trend Linked to Widespread 
Layoffs, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011 (discussing increase in discrimination charges during difficult 
economic times and citing management lawyer’s observation that employers take potential discrimination litigation 
into account in structuring layoffs and workforce reductions). 
292 See Neilsen & Beim, supra note 269, at 258. 
293 See id. at 261 (citations omitted). 
294 See id.  
295 See id. at 261; see also Jessica Fink, Unintended Consequences:  How Antidiscrimination Litigation Increases 
Group Bias in Employer-Defendants, 38 N.M. L.R. 333, 345-48 (2008) (describing extent to which Title VII 
litigation may create disincentive for employers to hire workers from protected classes). 
296 See Neilsen & Beim, supra note 269, at 261-262 (citations omitted). 
liability for employee claims of discriminatory or otherwise wrongful termination, among other 
claims.297  Thus, media accounts that tout victories by discrimination plaintiffs beyond those 
reflected in reality, and/or those that publicize improbably substantial awards, may create an 
artificial market for this expensive product.298  This fear of liability also likely promotes job 
security for the human resources staff within a company:  Employers who believe that they are 
merely one employment decision away from the receiving end of a risky and high-stakes 
discrimination lawsuit are likely to feel a greater need to retain the human resources 
professionals charged with guiding these decisions.299 
 
Finally, these media distortions both regarding the role of women in the workplace and 
regarding their potential to prevail in discrimination lawsuits may have a substantial negative 
impact on workplace morale.300  Research indicates that workers who claim to have experienced 
discrimination in the workplace often are viewed by colleagues as having themselves been at 
fault – often are themselves viewed as “troublemakers.”301  In the context of race discrimination 
complaints, for example, workers who claim to have experienced adverse treatment due to their 
race frequently are viewed as “making excuses” for their own workplace deficiencies or as trying 
to use the legal system to grab an unearned cash award.302   Notably, this type of negative 
response toward complaining individuals has been found to occur even when clear evidence 
indicated that the complaining individuals in fact had experienced discrimination.303   
 
Thus, a female employee who complains that she has experienced gender discrimination 
due to her appearance not only may find herself shoved into a particular box – labeled as the 
innocent victim or the conniving temptress – but also may herself be seen as creating this 
problem, perhaps by dressing in a certain manner or devoting excessive time to honing her 
feminine appearance.   Indeed, Nelson and similar “too hot” cases support this “blame the 
victim” mentality:  The Nelson court noted a factual dispute regarding whether Nelson’s attire 
actually was “too tight and revealing,” or whether it was appropriate, as Nelson alleged.304   
Media stories regarding terminated wholesale lingerie employee Lauren Odes raised similar 
concerns, discussing whether her “simple tee-shirt and jeggings” had been deemed “too 
distracting” for her employer.305   In neither of these discussions did the court or the media assert 
that Nelson or Odes’s choice of clothing was irrelevant to the discussion – that no matter what 
attire each woman chose to wear, it would not justify adverse treatment from her employer.  As 
other employees (particularly female employees) observe this dynamic, in which a colleague 
claims to have been penalized due to her gender and then is herself characterized as possibly 
creating her own problems, they not only may hesitate before voicing their own concerns about 
297 See id. at 262 (citations omitted). 
298 See id. (citation omitted).  While outside the scope of this paper, one area for future inquiry might involve 
determining whether businesses that employ a greater percentage of women or members of other protected groups 
tend to maintain more robust EPLI.   
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counsel.   
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304 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 65; see also id. at 65 n.3. 
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adverse treatment at work, but also may question whether their physical appearance is 
undermining their ability to succeed in their jobs.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 While it is easy to downplay the role of the media in shaping public views – to write the 
media off as no more than an infotainment-providing distraction – the media in fact plays a 
substantial role in setting the agenda for public discourse, informing citizens of facts that will 
shape their beliefs, and in promoting the policies and practices that employers, judges and 
legislators may adopt.  Thus, significant negative ramifications may arise when women in the 
public eye are portrayed in a misleading or otherwise in accurate manner – when evaluations of 
their physical attractiveness imbues articles in which appearance otherwise should play no role, 
or when their sexuality is generalized into one of two roles, Madonna or whore.  The Nelson case 
presents a prime example of how easy it is for the media, through even minimal skewing of its 
coverage, to alter drastically the way in which a story is portrayed, often resulting in misdirected 
ire from the public at large.   
 
To be sure, the actual decision in Nelson provided much to critique:  One understandably 
and reasonably could lament a decision that allows the jealousy of an employer’s spouse to 
justify an employee’s termination (particularly when the employee played a lesser, more passive 
role in fostering the relationship that led to the jealousy).  One also could question whether the 
court’s attempt to limit this case by placing so much emphasis on the “consensual” nature of the 
relationship between Knight and Nelson accurately reflects the realities of most worksites, where 
subordinate employees might hesitate before objecting to or deterring the advances of a boss or 
other superior.  Indeed, if carefully and accurately reported, a case like Nelson could open the 
door to important, broader discussions:  discussions about gender dynamics in the office and the 
role of women in the workplace; discussions about how employers and employees properly 
should navigate relationships that extend beyond the workplace; and discussions about the 
stereotypes and standards that society unwittingly imposes on employees based upon their 
gender.  But by oversimplifying this case – by portraying this case as one simply about a lust-
filled male employer and his blameless, pure female employee – the media obscured the 
relevance of these other points.  While many portrayed Nelsonas an example of a out-of-touch 
court gone awry, perhaps the case could better be understood as a missed opportunity for 
engaging in these important conversations. 
 
 
 
